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ABSTRACT 
 
Seulki Choi: Women’s Fertility and Labor Force Dynamics 
(Under the direction of Ted Mouw) 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three papers on low fertility and its implication. The first two 
chapters are social demographic studies and the last chapter is a formal demographic study. 
The first paper explores the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers, which is called 
the motherhood wage penalty. Previous researches have focused on the loss of job experience due 
to motherhood as a key reason of the penalty. On the contrary, this paper focuses on discrimination 
against motherhood. Using data from the 1982-2006 National Longitudinal Study of Youth with 
residual analysis, I find that women are experiencing 2% of motherhood wage discrimination per 
child. It is roughly one-third of the gross motherhood wage gap. I also find that the sizes of the 
discrimination are different by the location in the occupational hierarchy. Managers/professionals 
are not suffering from wage discrimination. Whereas, manual workers are suffering from the 
discrimination, 3% per child. In their gross penalty, 70% could be linked to discriminatory factors. 
It implies that gender wage discrimination may seem to decrease in spite of continued 
discrimination against worker-mothers. Instead, discrimination may just be modified or may happen 
at a different boundary, from women vs. men, to mothers vs. non-mothers. 
The second paper studies how women’s hourly wages affect childbearing using data from 
the 1982-2006 National Longitudinal Study of Youth. The results of discrete time hazard model 
show that a negative relationship between women’s hourly wage and fertility. But they are not 
consistent across education levels. Women who have a high school diploma or less are less likely to 
have children when their wages increase. But women who have some college experience or a 
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 college degree are likely to have children when their wages increase. It means that only for highly  
educated women who are likely to be in high paying decent jobs, the rise of income can be used as 
a resource for reconciling the mother’s and worker’s roles. Or, for less educated women who are 
likely to be in the low paying jobs, the rise of income is not large enough to lessen role 
incompatibility. It also could mean that when their income rises, less educated women have a bigger 
substitution effect, whereas highly educated women have a bigger income effect. 
 The third paper explores the recent decline of Total Fertility Rates in South Korea. TFR is 
composed of the interplay of two components; a change of the number of births (quantum) and the 
shift of the timing of those births (tempo). But previous research on the fertility decline in Korea 
has been conducted with a quantum driven perspective, and little has been conducted based on the 
tempo perspective. Using Bongaarts and Feeney method, I find that adj-TFRs(tempo-free TFRs) do 
not indicate the declines till 2000, unlike the decline of the conventional period TFR. It suggests 
that the decline is a tempo-driven phenomenon. After 2000, the size of the tempo effects is 
shrinking, though still sizable. Adj-TFRs with variance effect show that the tempo effect is 
somewhat exaggerated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Motherhood and Wage Discrimination 
 
 
Introduction 
Do mothers experience wage discrimination when compared to non-mothers in the work 
place? Women have been regarded as being less skilled, less experienced, and reluctant to do 
overtime or night work (Goldin 1994). These stereotypes mainly originate from the fact that a 
woman is a mother or might be a mother who is expected to be the primary caregiver of children 
and to do household chores. These stigmas have played a role in justifying gender discrimination. 
Fortunately women’s status has improved in recent decades especially in the work place. 
The labor force participation rate of women aged 16 and over has increased from 34 percent in 
1950 to 60 percent by the late 1990s, then it has receded slightly to 59.4 percent in 2006 (CPS 
2007). Among mothers with children under age 18, 67 percent were in the labor force in 2006 (CPS 
2007). Women also are increasingly occupying higher paying occupations. By 2002, one-third of 
women worked in managerial or professional occupations; in 1983, this figure was only 22 percent 
(CPS 2004). In 2006, among all management, professional, and related occupations, women 
accounted for 50.6 percent, though the share of women varies significantly by the specific 
occupation categories. For example, among engineering managers, only 7 percent are women, 
whereas 83 percent of social workers are women (CPS 2007).  
At the same time, the wage gap between men and women has narrowed. Female full-time 
workers’ median weekly earnings were 62% of men’s in 1979, but had increased to 81% by 2006 
(CPS 2007). Any reduction in the gender wage gap could imply reduced gender discrimination. 
Some scholars even argue that the current gender wage gap is entirely attributable to productivity 
differences, and to women’s choices (O'Neill 2003).  
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The reduction in the wage gap between men and women, however, may not be because 
gender discrimination has decreased, but because of increased heterogeneity within the female 
workforce. There are two kinds of female workers. One is a mother, who has the double burden of 
being both a mother following traditional women’s norms and a worker who is required to fulfill all 
the expectations in the workforce. The other is a non-mother who only chooses to assume the 
worker’s role like her male counterparts. A non-mother may be regarded as showing equal 
commitment to work and displaying a productivity that is indistinguishable from that of her male 
counterparts. Therefore, she may be able to successfully avoid discrimination. The female worker 
with a child, however, is often assumed to have inferior worker attributes. 
It is thus possible that gender discrimination happens mainly to women who have children. 
In other words, gender discrimination may seem to decrease in spite of continued discrimination 
against worker-mothers, but merely appears to have decreased because more women choose to 
defer childbearing or remain permanently childless, thus resulting in an underestimation of the 
amount of discrimination due to motherhood. Discrimination may just be modified or may happen 
at a different boundary, from women vs. men, to mothers vs. non-mothers. 
 
Figure 1.1. here 
 
The wage gap between mothers and women without children is called the family gap 
(Hardoy and Schøne 2004; Waldfogel 1997; Waldfogel 1998b) or the motherhood wage penalty 
(Budig and England 2001; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). It is different from the gender gap in 
that it compares wages earned across women. The “family gap” is not clear in that it fails to specify 
who has the burden. Unlike women, fathers earn more than men without children (Lundberg and 
Rose 2000).  
Figure 1.1 shows that a sizable wage gap continues between mothers and non-mothers. At 
age 30, the average hourly wage of women with no children was $17.21 in 2006 dollar. Women 
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who had one child earned $15.24, which is 88.5% of non-mothers’ hourly rate. Women who had 
two children earned much less, $12.24, 71.1% of the childless rate; this represents a $4.92/hour 
reduction. 
The motherhood wage gap has been reported in the U.S.A. (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 
2002; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Waldfogel 
1997; Waldfogel 1998a) and many other industrialized countries like Britain (Waldfogel 1998a), 
Norway (Hardoy and Schøne 2004), and Denmark (Gupta and Smith 2000). But previous 
researchers have tried to explain the wage gap mainly by the decline in productivity that is due to 
motherhood. Considerable attention has been paid to explain the wage gap among races and 
genders in terms of discrimination. But surprisingly, this discrimination perspective is hard to find 
in the research on the motherhood wage gap. 
The first question of this paper is whether any motherhood wage discrimination exists. 
Assuming an affirmative answer to this question, the second question is: which women are the most 
vulnerable to motherhood wage discrimination? According to one’s location in the occupational 
hierarchy, workers live in different situations; which may make them experience different degrees 
of the wage gap and with different reasons. Even though the size of the motherhood wage gap looks 
similar, the causes can be different. I expect that we will find different amounts and reasons for the 
wage gap according to the worker’s position in the occupational hierarchy. 
My research builds on Budig and England’s 2001 study. They use a fixed effect model to 
control for unobserved but constant individual characteristics which can affect both wages and 
fertility. Their study is focusing on relatively young women using the data, NLSY79:1982-1993. I 
will use NLSY79: 1982-2006. As this data has longer periods, I expect it covers the entire period of 
women’s reproductive ages. I will use the same fixed effects model but focus on productivity 
measures to differentiate discrimination from the wage gap. 
 
Motherhood Wage Discrimination. Why Does It Matter? 
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Discrimination is said to happen when otherwise identical people are treated adversely not 
because of a productivity differential, but because of a group identity which has no direct effect on 
their productivity (Heckman 1998). Motherhood wage discrimination arises when mothers earn 
lower wages than non-mothers while exhibiting the same productivity.  
Mothers could be discriminated against in securing jobs, placement in those jobs, and/or 
promotion in the work place. Mothers may more often be relegated to low-paying jobs than are 
non-mothers. Most high-paying jobs have been traditionally reserved for males. In the past, such 
jobs were regarded as fit only for men. Since more and more women are securing employment and 
competing with men, some employers may acknowledge that it is an old fashioned idea that women 
are inferior to men. Instead, they may think that lower productivity by women derives not from 
their sex, but from motherhood. For these reasons, some employers may discriminate specifically 
against mothers.  For the same reason, they may assign mothers to lower paying duties with 
reduced advancement potential. The discrimination could arise not only from the behavior of 
employers, but also from that of coworkers and/or customers. For example, a customer may dislike 
a saleswoman who has a child because s/he thinks such a saleswoman is more likely to be absent 
due to frequent emergency calls from her child/caretakers, and because it may be difficult to contact 
such a female employee when s/he need. 
The discrimination is malicious because it hurts equity. It is unfair in that the same level of 
work is treated unequally. It also is unfair in that the costs for childbearing and rearing are paid 
mainly by mothers, but the benefits are shared with all non-mothers. Child bearing and childrearing 
are socially beneficial acts (England and Folbre 1999; Folbre 1994).  They entail costs, time and 
effort, interruption in job experience which lowers human capital, and even discrimination. The 
problem is that mothers pay the majority of the costs and others in the society are free-riders.  
It also could link to positive externality issue1. In economics, an externality happens when 
                                                     
1 Positive externality issue is not limited to discriminatory part of motherhood wage gap but 
happens at the entire motherhood wage gap. That is why the wage gap should be cared about in the 
name of penalty. 
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prices do not reflect the full costs or benefits in production or consumption of goods or services. If 
there is no regulation – such as governmental intervention, negative externalities (for example 
pollution) are easy to be overproduced, while positive externalities (for example education and 
public safety) are easy to be underproduced. Childbearing and rearing is a case of positive 
externality. The most duties are burdened by women called mothers but the benefits are not limited 
to them. 
The discrimination could be malicious not only because it disadvantages mothers, but also 
because all of society is hurt when it results in inefficiency. All prejudicial discrimination is 
inefficient. If the ablest person is a mother and she will not work at a given lower wage due to 
discrimination, it will makes commodities or services either unavailable or more costly. In contrast, 
statistical discrimination, may not be inefficient. Statistical discrimination happens when an 
employer judges a person based not on her individual productivity but on a group image. An 
employer may have incomplete or imperfect information on an employee because gathering 
employee information is not without cost. For convenience, an employer may judge an employee 
not by her individual productivity, but by her group’s productivity. If the group information is true, 
using statistical discrimination in evaluation is an efficient way at least to individual employers.  
. 
 
Review of the Research on the Links between Motherhood Wage Gaps and Productivity 
If all wage gaps are examined from the perspective of productivity differences, any given 
wage gap could be legitimate. In other words, even if there are wage differences, it is not 
discrimination when these are underlain by productivity differentials. Discrimination happens only 
at the residual wage differences that cannot be explained by the productivity differentials.  
To separate discrimination from a wage gap, all the productivity related characteristics 
should be controlled. Audit study uses a quasi-experimental methodology to identify discrimination. 
Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) looked at motherhood discrimination through laboratory 
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experiments and an audit study. In the laboratory experiment they held constant the potential job 
applicants’ characteristics and varied only their motherhood, then asked fictitious employers to 
evaluate them. They found that employers regarded mothers as less competent and recommended 
starting salaries which were lower by 7.9% than the salaries they offered non-mothers. In the audit 
study, they sent real employers fictitious resumes which were otherwise identical except for their 
motherhood status, then checked the likelihood of receiving callbacks. They found that mothers 
received fewer callbacks. Their study suggests that motherhood discrimination exists, but there are 
several limitations to these studies. In the laboratory experiment, the fictitious employers were all 
college students. If students are more likely to be egalitarian than real employers, then 
discrimination would be underestimated. If these student “employers” acted based on stereotypes 
more often than real employers would, then discrimination would be overestimated. More 
importantly their study is limited to job offering and starting salary. It cannot study the wage 
differentials in the view of discrimination hereafter.  
Statistical residual analysis is another method to identify discrimination. In statistical 
residual analysis, all the characteristics related with productivity but not with discrimination should 
be included in the model. Then the unexplained wage gap left over in the residuals after controlling 
for productivity measures in the model is regarded as the discrimination effect. This paper will use 
this method.  
The causes of the motherhood wage gap can be broken down into four factors: (1) loss of 
human capital, (2) “compensating differentials” for motherhood-friendly jobs, (3) less “work effort” 
and (4) discrimination against mothers. Or the gap may be attributable to a spurious relationship 
due to some unmeasured heterogeneity (Budig and England 2001). Human capital is a measure of 
productivity potential. The compensating differential and work efforts are measures of voluntary 
reduction of productivity. 
There are other variables known to affect wages, such as occupation, industry, and union 
status. But these variables may be questionable to the extent that they are associated with 
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discrimination (Blau and Kahn 2000). As adding these variables could underestimate discrimination, 
this kind of variables should not be added in the model. 
 
Table 1.1 here 
 
Previous studies have shown that there is still a large unexplained residual even after 
controlling for human capital. After controlling for human capital, unobserved heterogeneity, and 
the part-time/full time variables, Waldfogel (1997) reports that 66 percent of the wage gap is still 
unexplained for one child, Budig and England (2001) report 70 percent, and Anderson et al. (2002) 
report 85 percent. (See Table 1.1) But it is not credible that all of these residuals are due to 
discrimination. There is always the possibility of measurement error in productivity measures, 
especially measures of human capital, and many studies fail to consider the possible effect of 
voluntary reduction of productivity. If such measurements of productivity are incomplete, then 
discrimination could be overestimated. 
 
Productivity Potential: Loss of Human Capital 
The human capital model is the most influential economic theory explaining wage 
differentials in the labor market (Becker 1985; Mincer and Ofek 1982). Human capital can be 
divided into two types – general human capital and firm-specific human capital. General human 
capital consists of any common and transportable ability. It can be inborn cognitive ability, health, 
physical strength, and so on. It also can be obtained during general education. A high school 
diploma could be one example. Job-based human capital is obtained through job experience. This 
type of human capital is mostly blamed for the wage gap. Since motherhood hampers career-
continuity, differences in the length of job experience and relocation to a new job after childbirth 
link to the loss of human capital. 
Career discontinuity is likely to restrict the accumulation of human capital in three ways. 
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First, mothers cannot accumulate additional human capital during their maternity leaves. Second, 
during such leaves, their human capital is likely to depreciate since their skills and qualifications 
may become obsolete in the workplace, or skills may be forgotten due to disuse. Third, if a mother 
cannot return to the same company after a birth, her firm-specific experience she acquired earlier 
would no longer be valid. If she changes her occupation, occupation-specific skills and experience 
would be adjusted downward significantly. 
Human capital is usually measured by cognitive skills, age, the length of education, and 
job-experience. Especially regarding job experience, it has been measured by all accumulated work 
years (Waldfogel 1997), work years at the occupation at an industry (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 
2002), or all working years and work years at a company (Budig and England 2001). Waldfogel and 
Budig and England divide the measures further into full time and part time work years. In this study, 
I will measure two kinds of job experiences – overall job experience and firm-specific experience. 
The former will be measured by years of all job experience. The latter will be measured by years of 
employer-specific job experience (which is called tenure). 
Depreciation of human capital is also an important factor. Even though two workers have 
the same amount of job experience and education, their human capital could be different if one was 
out of the labor market recently. If the leave is longer, the amount of depreciation will be larger. To 
capture this, Budig and England (2001) use the number of breaks in their model, and Anderson et 
al.(2002) consider the time out of the labor market (=age-edu-experience-6). But the number of 
breaks cannot measure the duration leave before having this job. Moreover, the breaks may not be 
related with motherhood. If it is from taking another job offer or pursuing advanced education, the 
leave is more likely to be associated with a wage increase. The time out of the labor market is an 
incomplete measure in that it fails to differentiate the recent leaves from the previous ones. For 
example, two elementary teachers with the same age and job experiences could have different 
amounts of skills. Imagine that one took 4 years to be a teacher after graduation has worked for 4 
years without interruption while the other became a teacher right after graduation and worked for 4 
9 
years and just returned from 4 years of maternity leave. The former’s experience will be fully 
appreciated while the latter’s experience will be partially appreciated. In this study, to measure the 
amount of depreciation of human capital, years of leave during the recent four years will be used.  
 
Voluntary Productivity Reduction: Compensating Differential for Motherhood-friendly Job 
Characteristics and Less Work Effort 
 
Unlike non-mothers, mothers are likely to have difficulty in realizing their full 
productivity potential. Even with the same amount of human capital, mothers can show less 
productivity by preferring motherhood-friendly jobs or jobs requiring less work effort (Becker 1985; 
Budig and England 2001).  
Mothers also may not pursue the maximum wage that corresponds to their productivity 
level. They may barter away better wages for a baby-friendly working environment; this is called a 
“compensating differential.” Or they may retreat from full productivity at the work place in order to 
spare energy for their home responsibilities; this is called less “work effort.” Women may choose a 
job which will lessen their commuting hours, one which offers more lenient work rules (such as 
flexible working hours, fewer demands for evening work, etc.), or they may choose one that can 
give non-pecuniary amenities (such as on-site day-care services) even though the wage may not be 
the best. If a woman has children, it means she has a double burden, which is not easy to handle. 
Especially when the child is young, intense caretaking is needed. Sometimes she may need to leave 
early to respond to baby emergencies. She may not do her best at work in order to conserve energy 
later in the day for child care and other housework chores. Or taking care of the children before 
work begins may leave her already exhausted, so that she cannot work at peak capacity. Mothers 
may choose part-time jobs instead of full time jobs to save time and energy, even though part-time 
jobs are usually limited in their advancement possibilities and pay lower hourly wages.  
Anderson et al. (2003) found that the wage gap diminishes as the youngest child grows 
older, and the wage gap for women who have a 0-2 year-old child is significantly larger than the 
wage gap for mothers with an older child. These findings show that the compensating differentials 
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and work effort could affect the wage gap.  
 
What if Productivity is Endogenous to Discrimination? 
Productivity and discrimination were assumed to be independent in the previous chapter. 
But productivity could be endogenous to motherhood discrimination. If this is the case, then 
discrimination could be underestimated. 
What if a woman is forced to leave her job or cannot return to her work place after a birth 
because of discrimination? The reduced job experience and relocation, which is a direct result of 
motherhood discrimination, will lower her human capital and make her earn less.  
The same logic could apply to voluntary productivity reduction. For example, a mother 
could choose a part-time job because she needs flexible work hours and cannot make a full-time 
commitment to work. But she may be forced to choose a part-time job because full-time jobs are 
not open to mothers as much as non-mothers. If there is job segregation against mothers and they 
have no choice but to overcrowd into lower paying jobs, their choice is actually forced and it should 
be regarded as discrimination. Correll, Benard and Paik (2007)’s laboratory experiments and audit 
study find that at the job searching and interview procedure, mothers are suffering from 
discrimination.   
Anderson et al(2003) find that the wage gap diminishes as children grow older. A mother 
with an infant/toddler must devote more efforts to child caring and is more eager to have 
motherhood friendly working environment. Therefore she would accept lower wage to save work 
efforts and compensating differentials. The incompatibility between worker’s role and mother’s role 
will shrink as her child grows. But the declining wage gap could be explained by discrimination. An 
employer may discriminate more against a mother with younger children. An employer may believe 
that a mother of a teenager has a similar work ethic to a non-mother but a mother of an 
infant/toddler gives more priority to her own child. Also, an employer may simply dislike the smell 
of breast milk or diapers. 
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Budig and England (2001) add various job characteristics obtained from the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor 1977) to examine the effects of compensating 
differential and work effort in their regression model. They find that the effect is small, and argue 
that making a distinction between choice and discrimination does not matter. 
 
Why Does The Wage Gap Differ By Position in the Occupational Hierarchy? 
A few investigators have paid attention to diversification in the motherhood wage gap. 
Using the 1968-1988 NLSY, Waldfogel (1997) found that the motherhood wage gap tends to rise 
with educational level. Using the 1982-1993 NLSY, Budig and England (2001) studied the effects 
of skilled/non-skilled worker, years of education, and hierarchy of jobs. They argue that there is no 
clear evidence that more skilled or committed women experience a wider wage gap. They did report 
that women hired in full time jobs suffered a bigger wage gap. Using 1968-1988 NLSYW data, 
Anderson et al. (2002) analyzed the wage gap by educational level.  They reported that: 1) low-
skilled workers (without a high school diploma) experience the smallest wage gap since they have 
less human capital but the amount of human capital is not as important as in other higher paying 
jobs; 2) highly-skilled workers (college graduates) suffer from the biggest wage gap, (which can be 
explained by the number of years out of the workforce); and 3) high school graduates fall mid-way 
between these two groups. Anderson et al. (2003) found that high school dropouts only suffer from 
a wage gap when their children are very young, and this does not last when the children grow up. 
Why does the motherhood wage gap differ by position in the occupational hierarchy? 
Wright argues that there are complexities among the working class. (Wright 1979; Wright 1997; 
Wright and Perrone 1977) Workers’ bargaining power could differ according to their location in 
relation to authority and to scarce skills. Workers who are in charge of management could earn 
bargaining power by dominating other workers within production. As managerial behavior is 
relatively hard to monitor and is needed more for creative behavior, higher earnings, so called 
“loyalty rent”, could be provided. Like managers, employees who have a high level of skills or 
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expertise are also in a privileged location in product relations. As skills and expertise are frequently 
scarce in the workplace, they command a better reward, or “skill rent”. Because professionals have 
more specialized and irreplaceable knowledge of their work, they also are hard to monitor. Because 
they have greater authority and autonomy in the workplace, managers and professionals can earn a 
higher income and fight against discrimination successfully in the working place. 
I will divide the occupational hierarchy into three categories---managers/professionals, non-
manual workers, and manual workers. The characteristics of manual workers are not limited to their 
physical condition (Gagliani 1981). They are more subject to surveillance and suffer from higher 
unemployment rates. The situation of non-manual workers is closer to manual workers in that they 
also are under surveillance and have less bargaining power. But they have a comparatively open 
ladder to promotion and can become managers/professionals in the future.  
The loss of human capital can be quite different by one’s position in the occupational 
hierarchy.  To manual workers, a leave means only the duration without wages, since they have 
limited chances for promotion by work experience. So when they return to the work force, their 
human capital changes little. But human capital is crucial to managers/professionals. Anderson et al. 
(2002) found differences in the size of the gross wage gap by education, and reported that highly 
educated mothers are more vulnerable to loss of human capital. 
Work effort and compensating differentials also differ by position in the occupational 
hierarchy.  Lareau (2003) argues that there is a different child-rearing culture in the middle class 
vis-à-vis the working class. She says middle class parents emphasize “concerted cultivation” 
through organized leisure activities, while working class parents emphasize “natural growth” and 
are more likely to believe that children can enjoy leisure activities by themselves. 
Managers/professionals have more monetary resources. They can buy more convenient home 
appliances, or employ maids and babysitters to lessen the burden of work in the home. Thus, they 
can devote almost their full energy to their work productivity, like non-mothers. I assume that 
manual workers spend less time caring for their children than do non-manual workers. Then I can 
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hypothesize that manual work does not have much impact on their work effort when they have 
children, whereas non-manual workers should have. The resources that managers/professionals 
have make their environment more mother-friendly and give them greater bargaining power to 
make their working environments more favorable. 
Having a bias against mothers is not a sufficient condition for discrimination. Another 
requisite is that the discriminatees are weaker than the discriminators. The discriminator should be 
strong enough to be able to show his/her distaste towards mothers. So discrimination can only 
happen in the context of an uneven power relationship. In the labor market, even among employees, 
the power is not equally distributed and some employees have sufficient power to fight against their 
employers. An employee who has a higher rank or who has professional skills can fight against 
discrimination using its assets or rents. An employee who has a lower rank and can be easily 
interchanged with another worker is the most vulnerable to discrimination. 
I expect that the mother who has more power, the managers/professionals will be less 
vulnerable to discrimination. They usually have more authority and autonomy and enjoy better 
earnings, including the rents. Using this resource, they can resist discrimination more efficiently. 
Manual workers have fewer resources and less bargaining power in the labor market. They could be 
the weakest victims of discrimination. I expect that human capital has more explanatory power in 
the case of the managers/professionals’ motherhood wage gap. In the case of work effort, non-
manual workers will be the most vulnerable. In short, according to his/her location in the 
occupational hierarchy, each worker has a different wage gap and for different reasons. 
 
Table 1.2 here. 
 
Data, Measures and Models 
Data 
I use the 1982-2006 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a nationally 
14 
representative longitudinal sample of individuals who were age 14-21 on December 31. 1978. 
These individuals were interviewed annually though 1994, and are currently interviewed biannually. 
Black and Hispanics are excluded to simplify the analysis as they are vulnerable to race and 
ethnicity discrimination. The data is further limited to women whose jobs are not military, self-
employed nor family business because their wages are not market based. Observations at age less 
than 18 are dropped. Since a fixed effects model requires at least two observations for each person, 
if a respondent reported her wage only once, she was dropped from the current study. The final 
dataset is 3,087 women and 32,964 measures. 
To see the change in motherhood wage discrimination by occupational hierarchy, the 
dataset will be divided into three subsamples: managers/professionals, non-manual workers, and 
manual workers based on the 1970 Census Occupational Classification System. Professionals mean 
professional specialty occupations such as physicians, registered nurses, lawyers, scientists, 
engineers, and teachers. Managers include executive, administrative and managerial occupations. 
Supervisors and foremen are added into managers as they have a limited authority in the work place. 
Non-manual workers are sales workers and clerical occupations. Manual workers consist of craft 
workers, operatives, laborers and service workers.  
If most women have childbearings before they established professional jobs or promoted 
to managerial jobs, managers/professionals may have not enough variation in the number of births. 
As average ages of managers/professionals are higher than others, it could be a legitimate concern. 
Among respondents who have experienced managers/professionals more than once, there are 2100 
births. Among the 2100 births, 944 births happened when their mothers are managers/professionals.  
  
Statistical Model 
Log Hourly Wageit =  αi + β1 (Number of Children)it  
+ β2 (Demographic Variables)it 
                    + β3 (Measures of Human Capital) it  
+ β4 (Measures of Work Effort and Compensating 
Differentials)it  
                    + μi + vt + wit 
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where i indexes individual women and t indexes time (1982,1983,…,2006) 
μ is the individual component of error,  
v is the timewise component of error, and  
w is the random error. 
  
I will use a fixed effects regression model. Effects are fixed for periods and individuals. 
Period fixed effects are expected to control for year-specific characteristics. Individual fixed effects 
are expected to control for personal characteristics, which are constant during each measurement.  
It is hypothesized that motherhood affects women’s wages but the causal relationship could 
be spurious. There is a possibility that extraneous variables affect childbearing and wage at the 
same time and there are no or less direct causal effects between them. Examples of this might be 
physical strength, health and cognitive ability, or individual preferences for babies or careers. If a 
woman has higher academic skills, she may be more likely to pursue a career-oriented life and 
delay having a family as she knows her opportunity costs are relatively larger. If she has poor health, 
she may be more likely to have children and spend less effort on her career, because she knows the 
opportunity costs are relatively less. If a woman has a tendency to build a family at an early age, 
this can make her have more children as well as earn less. On the contrary, if she has a tendency to 
succeed professionally, this will make her earn more, and have less or no children.  
Previous studies have dealt with this problem using a fixed effects model. (Waldfogel 1997, 
Budig and England 2001, Anderson et al. 2002, Glauber 2007) Many of these extraneous 
heterogeneities are unobservable or hard to measure. But if it can be assumed that such 
characteristics are pre-set or constant at least during the working years, then they could be removed 
by person fixed effects which absorb any time-invariant and unobserved variables. This research 
also adopts a fixed effects model. 
If decisions to leave the labor force are due to childbearing, or if the decisions to come back 
into the labor force after the leave are not random, the sample selection could be biased. 
Considering the decent fringe benefits and higher opportunity costs that exist for higher earners, 
they may be more likely to come back into the labor force after childbearing. Considering the 
16 
significance of the mother’s contribution to the family income in the case of lower earners, they 
also may be likely to come back. So, female workers in the middle class are probably more likely to 
leave the labor force forever. Because wages are only observable for women who are working, the 
resulting biased sample could underestimate the motherhood wage discrimination if women who 
would be subject to the biggest discrimination are the most likely to remain out of the labor force. 
Glauber (Glauber 2007), who used the same dataset that I do (NLSY79: 1982-2004) to study the 
moderating effects of race and marriage on motherhood wage gap, checked selection bias using the 
Heckman Selection Model and found no bias. 
 
Table 1.3 here 
 
Measures 
The dependent variable will be the natural log of the hourly wage of the respondent’s 
current job. The hourly wage is a measure of earning potential. Monthly or biweekly wages may 
change even when the hourly wage remains constant by changing working hours. Because the 
primary purpose of this study is to determine the effect that discrimination has on the wage gap 
between mothers and non-mothers, earning potential should be a better measure than the total 
income. The hourly wage will be adjusted to the currency value in 2006 dollars. If it is less than $2 
or more than $100, then it will be considered on an outlier and thrown out. Only 1.9% of wages are 
smaller than $2 and 0.2% of wages are bigger than $100. Moreover most wages more than $100 are 
not consistent from wages of adjacent years of the individuals. 
The dependent variable will be in its log-transformed state instead of its original metric 
state. Since women’s hourly wages have a positively skewed distribution, the log functions 
transforms it to a more normal distribution. More importantly, it enhances the interpretability. That 
is, one unit change in the independent variable results in a 100* beta coefficient percent change in 
women’s hourly wage when all other variables in the model are held constant.  
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Control variables are categorized into three groups. Demographic variables such as age 
and marital status will be used to control for basic demographic characteristics. Human capital 
variables will measures the productivity potentials using intrinsic ability, health issue, education 
and job experience. Voluntary reduction of productivity will be measured by a dummy variable of 
part time/full time, a dummy variable of if she has more than one job. 
Intrinsic ability is measured by Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores which 
were administered in 1980. As it is not a time-varying variable, it is added only in an OLS model 
while it is absorbed into individual fixed effects in FEM.  
A dummy variable of having health problem asks if the respondent is “limited in the kind 
of work she (could) do on a job for pay because of her health as of survey date.” Among entire 
measures, 5% responded that they had a health problem. 
Job experience is measured in three ways. General job experience is measured by years of 
education and entire years of work experiences. Firm-specific job experience (tenure) is measured 
by years of job experience from a particular employer. As most job experience is obtained during 
the early stages of work, the squared years of job experiences will be added. To capture the 
depreciation of job experience during the leave, the duration out of working place in recent 4 years 
is used. 
Voluntary reduction of productivity is measured in two ways. They are (1) a dummy 
variable of whether the interviewee is at full time job (more than 35 hours per week) and (2) a 
dummy variable of whether the interviewee has more than two jobs simultaneously at the interview 
date.  
 
Results 
Does a woman with children have less productivity potentials in the work place? Table 1.4. 
presents the average wages and various productivity measures by number of births in Non-Hispanic, 
Non-Black individuals from NLSY79:1980-2006.  
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Table 1.4 here 
 
Before age-standardization shows average measures with no adjustment. The hourly wages 
of women with no children is 14.36 dollars. These are slightly higher than those of women with 
children by .11 dollars when compared to women with one child and .23 dollars when compared to 
women with two or more children. Non-mothers have longer years of education, shorter years of 
recent unemployment and higher proportion of full time jobs. Interestingly their job experiences are 
shorter than mothers. Compared to non-mothers, mothers with two or more children have 4.02 more 
years of total work experience and work 1.49 more years for the current employer on average. 
But mothers’ longer job experiences may result from the fact that mothers are typically 
older than non-mothers. To make a true comparison, it is desirable that mothers and non-mothers 
have the same age composition. ‘After age-standardization’ shows the mean measures when each 
group has the same proportionate age composition, which is calculated using the average of the 
three groups’ age composition (For the details, see Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001. pp.24-30). 
The differences of wages, education, and years of the leave among groups widen. If she has no 
children, a woman would earn $15.12. If she has a child, her hourly wages would decline to $13.26 
and further to $11.67 with two children. Mothers are more likely to have shorter years of education 
and longer years of recent unemployment than non-mothers. The differences of proportion of full 
time jobs among groups gets smaller after the standardization, though non-mothers are still more 
likely to have full time jobs.  
Unlike before age-standardization, after age-standardization shows that years of work 
experience and tenure of mothers are shorter than non-mothers’. Non mothers have longer work 
experience than mothers with one child by .82 years and mothers with two or more children by 1.55 
years. Non mothers also have worked for the current employer longer than mothers with one child 
by .22 years and mothers with two or more children by .53 years.  
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The only exception is the proportion that has multiple jobs. Non-mothers are more likely to 
have multiple jobs than mothers, which would affect their wages negatively. 
The number of births is negatively associated with hourly wage and most productivity 
measures. If the age effect is neutralized, non-mothers enjoy higher wages, which may be justified 
by their better education, longer job experiences and higher proportion of full time jobs. But it is 
still not certain whether the entire wage gap could be justified or whether there is discrimination. To 
answer this question, residual analysis is suggested. 
 
Table 1.5 here 
 
Table 1.5 presents outputs of various regression analyses. The key interest is at the 
coefficient of number of births. It shows how wage changes when a woman has an additional child 
holding all other variables constant, which is the size of motherhood wage penalty.  
Model 1-3 is OLS models and Model 4-6 is Fixed Effects models. OLS models include 
year dummies. AFQT is added only at model 2 and 3. As an AFQT is assumed not changing during 
her lifetime and measured only once, it cannot be added in fixed effects models. Its effect is 
expected to be absorbed in the fixed effects.  
The gross penalty is the coefficient of number of births when there are no controls other 
than demographic variables (age and marital status) and person-specific /year-specific fixed effects. 
Model 4 shows that gross wage penalty for each child is 5.8%. The penalty from the comparable 
OLS model (model1) is 12.4% and it suggests that there is sizable negative selectivity into having 
children on unobserved characteristics.  
Adding human capital measures in model 5, the penalty declines to 2.8%. Further adding 
voluntary reduction of productivity potentials at model 6, the penalty, assumed to the size of 
discrimination is 2%. Table 5 shows that half of the gross penalty could be explained by the reduced 
human capital (52%=1-2.8/5.8). Productivity differentials could explain 65% (=1-2/5.8) of 
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motherhood wage gap. One thirds of the wage gap still exists unexplained and it is attributable to 
discriminatory factors.  
When adding a dummy variable of whether there is a infant/toddler in the household at 
model 6, the coefficient of number of births is -.024, which is statistically significant at p<.001.(this 
result is not shown in the table) Infant/toddler is defined a child under age 3. It is not limited to a 
biological child but includes any step/adopted children. As a measure of work effort, it is expected 
to be associated with voluntary reduction of productivity. Even though it is known as an effective 
measure of work effort(Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003), it is also directly connected with 
discrimination. A woman with an infant or toddler is more easily identifiable as a mother than a 
woman with a teenager, and she is likely to be a target of the discrimination. 
 
Figure 1.2 here 
 
Is the motherhood wage discrimination different by the location in the occupational 
hierarchy? Figure 1.2 shows LOWESS graph of hourly wages of managers/professionals, non-
manual workers and manual workers in NLSY79:1982-2006. In all three groups, women without 
children earn the highest wages. It clearly shows that having a child is negatively associated with 
women’s wages. The absolute wage gap looks wider for managers/professionals. Compared to 
manual workers, non-manual workers have a wider wage gap in their mid thirties. The graphs after 
age 40 are not as meaningful for the sample sizes are not sufficient there. 
 
Table 1.6 here 
 
Table 1.6 presents only the coefficient of number of births at the various models by three 
occupational groups. Each column is equivalent to Table 1.5.  
The gross penalty is the largest for non-manual workers. In the fixed-effects model, the 
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gross penalty of non-manual workers is 5.1% and that of the manual workers is the second largest at 
4.2%. The managers/professionals have only a 3.5% gross penalty. Interestingly the gross penalty in 
the OLS models is the largest at managers/professionals. The huge size gap between OLS and FEM 
in managers/professionals suggests that the effects of unobserved characteristics which could affect 
fertility and wages together are the highest to managers/professionals. It implies that women who 
would like to be managers or professionals have higher tendency to develop their careers and 
fertility plans together. 
After controlling for human capital measures, the penalty for managers/professionals is 
reduced to 1.4%. At the full model, it shrinks further and changes to be statistically insignificant. 
Managers and professionals look to be suffering less from motherhood discrimination. For non-
manual workers, the wage penalty decreases to one third of the gross penalty after controlling for 
productivity measures but still shows 1.7% of a discriminatory wage penalty at the full model. 
Quite differently to other two groups, manual workers show less change in the penalty size when 
adding productivity measures. Productivity measures could explain only 28.6% of the penalty and 
the unexplained portion could link to discrimination. Their gross penalty is in the middle, but their 
discriminatory wage penalty is the largest. 
These findings support my hypothesis. For Managers/professionals, the wage gap is 
explained by a loss of human capital. With the help of their authority and autonomy in the working 
place, they could defeat motherhood discrimination. For non-manual workers, the wage gap is the 
largest and the explanatory power of loss human capital is somewhat smaller than to 
managers/professionals. But their wage gap is explained mainly by productivity measures as well. 
Manual workers are at the lowest rank and have the least resources to fight against motherhood 
discrimination.  
 
Table 1.7 here 
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Table 1.7 presents that authority and autonomy are important even among manual workers. 
At table 1.7, manual workers are divided into three groups by the degree of skills – craft workers, 
operatives, and laborers/service workers. Craft workers are relatively high skilled manual workers. 
They need extensive periods of training, have comprehensive knowledge of the process and are 
sometimes allowed exercising a considerable amount of independent judgment. Carpenters, 
plumbers, and tailors are in this category. Operatives are semiskilled. They operate machines and 
usually require a few weeks of training. Assemblers, riveters and drivers are in this category. 
Laborers and service workers are unskilled manual workers. Their duties can be mastered within a 
few days and ask no independent judgment. Miscellaneous construction laborers, waitress, and 
maids are in this category. Table 1.7 shows that for laborers/service workers, more than 90% of the 
motherhood wage gap comes from discriminatory factors.  
 
Discussion 
Mothers earn less than non-mothers. Less job experiences, lower education and less 
commitment can be a partial reason. But there is still an unexplained portion from productivity 
differentials.  
Using residual analysis I find that women are experiencing 2% of a motherhood wage 
discrimination per child. It is roughly one-third of the gross motherhood wage gap. The sizes of the 
discrimination are different by the location in the occupational hierarchy. Managers/professionals 
are not suffering from motherhood wage discrimination. Non-manual workers are suffering from 
the largest motherhood wage penalty but two-thirds of these are attributable to loss of human 
capital and voluntary reduction of productivity; only one third (1.7% per one child) are linked to 
discriminatory factors. Manual workers are suffering from the discrimination, 3% per child. Loss of 
human capital could explain the majority of the wage penalty typically but it is not the case to 
manual workers. In their gross penalty, 70% could be linked to discriminatory factors. 
Laborers/Service workers are the most vulnerable to the discrimination. Their wages get lowered by 
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5.5% per child because of discrimination.  
The size of discrimination is different by the degree of power in the working place. Having 
authority and autonomy is a key factor explaining why workers in the higher location in the 
occupational hierarchy are suffering less from the discrimination. Manual workers, especially 
laborers/service workers who have no skills are the most vulnerable to the discrimination. 
This study may overestimate the discrimination if the productivity measure is incomplete 
so much as to fail to isolate the discriminatory factors into the residuals. On the contrary, it may 
underestimate the discrimination if productivity measures are associated with discrimination.  
There is a possibility that years of job experience and having a full/part time job or 
multiple jobs are associated with the discrimination. But at least these variables are a legitimate 
excuse to an individual employer who already hired mothers with lower but ‘market-oriented’ 
wages compared to non-mothers. In this sense, this paper gauges the size of motherhood 
discrimination in a conservative way. In a broader perspective, motherhood wage discrimination 
would be larger and more complicated.   
Nonetheless this study clearly shows that 1) sizable portion of the wage gap is originated 
from motherhood wage discrimination, 2) the amount and the reason of motherhood wage penalty 
and motherhood discrimination were different by the location in the occupational hierarchy. I fail to 
find the discriminatory wage gap from professionals and managers. Their authority and autonomy 
could make them resist the discrimination. The unfair treatments occur mainly at the bottom of the 
labor force. They are mothers with less or no skills. 
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Figure 1.1. Lowess Graph of Hourly Wages by Number of Children, NLSY 79:1982-2006 
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Table 1.1. Previous Research. 
 Data Total Wage Gap1 Residual Gap2 
Waldfogel (1997) NLS Young Women: 
1968-1988 
6% for one child 4% for one child 
 13% for two or more children 
12% for two or more 
children 
Budig and   
 England (2001) NLSY79: 1982-1993 7% per child 5% per child 
Anderson et al. 
(2002) 
NLS Young Women: 
1968-1988,  
Non Hispanic White 
women only 
4% for one child 3.4% for one child 
 8% for two or more children 
5.6% for two or more 
children 
1 Total wage gap means gross wage gap which controls only marital status  
(Waldfogel 1997 used OLS to obtain the total wage gap, whereas other studies used FEM) 
2 Residual gap means the wage gap after controlling for Human Capital, Part-time Employment, 
Unobserved Heterogeneity, etc..  
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Table 1.2. List of Hypotheses on Motherhood Wage Penalty by Occupational Hierarchy. 
Occupational Hierarchy Hypothesis 
Managers/Professionals The main reason for the wage gap is loss of human capital.
Non-Manual Workers The main reason for the wage gap is less work effort and 
compensating differentials. 
Manual Workers The main reason for the wage gap is discrimination. 
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Table 1.3. Descriptive Statistics: NLSY79, 1982-2006 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of Birth 1.037 1.18 0 10
Hourly Wage 14.26 8.73 2.00 96.02
Log Hourly Wage 2.51 0.53 0.69 4.56
Demographic Variables 
Age 30.83 7.04 18.01 49.75
Dummy of Currently Married 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Human Capital Variables 
AFQT score 54.50 25.68 1 99
Dummy of having Health Problem 0.05 0.21 0 1
Years of Education 13.43 2.23 4 20
Years of Work Experience 9.90 6.11 0.02 28.67
Years of Tenure 3.74 4.23 0.02 28.52
Years of Unemployment Period 0.38 0.76 0 4
Voluntary Reduction 
Dummy of Full Time Job 0.74 0.44 0 1
Dummy of More than Two Job 0.20 0.29 0 1
Average Waves per Person 13.12 
Number of Persons 3,087
Number of Observations 32,964
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.4. Mean Measures before and after Age-Standardization: NLSY79, 1982-2006 
Before Age-Standardization After Age-Standardization 
 
No 
Birth 
One 
Birth 
Two 
Births+ 
No 
Birth 
One 
Birth 
Two 
Births+ 
Age 27.55 31.00 35.17 
Hourly Wage 14.36 14.25 14.13 15.12 13.26 11.67 
% Married 0.32 0.62 0.74 0.36 0.61 0.73 
Years of Education 13.93 13.10 12.94 14.14 13.08 12.27 
Years of Work Experience 8.09 10.31 12.11 10.99 10.17 8.62 
Years of Tenure 3.07 3.89 4.56 3.80 3.58 3.05 
Years of Unemployment 
Period 0.28 0.37 0.51 0.24 0.40 0.64 
% of Full Time Job 0.80 0.74 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.67 
% of More than Two Jobs 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.18 
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Table 1.5. Effects of Number of Children on Women’s Wage, NLSY79, 1982-2006 
OLS FEM 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Number of Births  -0.124***   -0.026*** -0.020***  -0.058***  -0.028***   -0.020***
            (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age   0.033***  -0.001  -0.002   0.028***   -0.015***    -0.015***
            (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married   0.052***    0.017** 0.017**   0.067***   0.023***    0.024***
            (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
AFQT          0.003*** 0.003***                   
                   (0.000) (0.000)                   
Health Problem        -0.078***  -0.076***       -0.044***   -0.042***
                   (0.012) (0.012)      (0.011) (0.011) 
Education        -0.100***  -0.093***       -0.136***   -0.139***
                   (0.010)   (0.010)      (0.020) (0.020) 
(Education)2        0.006***   0.006***        0.007***    0.007***
                   (0.000)   (0.003)      (0.001) (0.001) 
Work Experience        0.026***   0.026***        0.057***    0.055***
                   (0.002)   (0.002)      (0.003) (0.003) 
(Work Experience)2        0.000    -0.000***       -0.001***   -0.001***
                   (0.000)   (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure        0.040***   0.038***        0.033***    0.032***
                   (0.002)   (0.002)      (0.001) (0.001) 
(Tenure)2        -0.001***  -0.001***       -0.001***   -0.001***
                   (0.000)   (0.000)      (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployed Period        -0.051***  -0.045***       -0.040***  -0.037***
                   (0.004)   (0.004)      (0.003) (0.003) 
Full Time Job             0.097***               0.068***
                        (0.006)             (0.005) 
More than Two Job             -0.085***              -0.062***
                        (0.008)             (0.007) 
Year Dummies Year Dummies are Not shown 
 
Constant      1.523***    2.312*** 2.220***  1.665***  2.884***   2.888***  
            (0.030) (0.074) (0.074) (0.011) (0.143) (0.142) 
N 32,964 31,938 31938 32,964 32,964 32,964 
LL          -2.36E+04 -1.83E+04 -1.81E+04 -1.08E+04 -8991.18 -8860.88 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 
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Figure 1.2. Lowess Graph of Hourly Wages by Three Locations in the Occupational Hierarchy, 
NLSY 79:1982-2006 
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Table 1.6. Estimated Wage Penalty with Motherhood by Three Locations in the Occupational 
Hierarchy, NLSY79, 1982-2006 
Controls Managers/ Professionals 
Non-Manual 
Workers 
Manual 
Workers  
OLS    
Gross Penalty1 -0.087*** -0.081*** -0.080***
Above+Human Capital2 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.035***
 Above+Voluntary Reduction3 -0.012** -0.005 -0.034***
    
FEM    
Gross Penalty4 -0.035*** -0.051*** -0.042***
Above+Human Capital5 -0.014* -0.024*** -0.031** 
Above+Voluntary Reduction6 -0.009 -0.017** -0.030** 
    
Penalty explained by Human Capital (%) 60.0% 52.9% 26.2% 
Penalty explained by the full Model (%) 74.3% 66.7% 28.6% 
Unexplained Penalty (%) 25.7% 33.5% 71.4% 
    
Number of Observations 10,927 11,204 9,367 
Number of Women 1,673 1,835 01,663 
Notes:1 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model1 in Table 1.5. 
2 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model2 in Table 1.5. 
3 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model3 in Table 1.5. 
4 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model4 in Table 1.5. 
5 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model5 in Table 1.5. 
6 The penalty is equivalent to the coefficient of number of birth at model6 in Table 1.5. 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 **p<.001 
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Table 1.7. Estimated Wage Penalty with Motherhood among Manual Workers, NLSY79, 1982-2006 
Controls Craft Workers 
Operatives Laborers & 
Service Workers  
OLS    
Gross Penalty -0.046* -0.030*** -0.101***
Above+Human Capital -0.023 0.007 -0.055***
Above+Voluntary Reduction -0.016 0.008 -0.055***
    
FEM    
Gross Penalty -0.047 -0.010 -0.061***
Above+Human Capital -0.038 -0.005 -0.055***
Above+Voluntary Reduction -0.034 -0.005 -0.057***
    
Penalty explained by Human Capital (%) 19.1%   50.0%    9.8% 
Penalty explained by the full Model (%) 27.7%   50.0%    6.6% 
Unexplained Penalty (%) 72.3%   50.0%   93.4% 
    
Number of Observations 449 2,121 6,076 
Number of Women 119 443 01,286 
*p<.05 **p<.01 **p<.001 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WOMEN’S WAGE, CHILDBEARING AND EDUCATION 
 
 
Introduction 
Does a woman’s wage influence her fertility? Does an increasing woman’s wage booster 
or lower her fertility? Is the association the same across educational groups? This paper will 
research how women’s wages affect childbearing.  
Using June 1990 and June 1995 U.S. Current Population Surveys (CPS), Martin (2000) 
finds a widening educational gap in fertility. It shows that highly educated women have a higher 
probability of having their second child after age 30. Accepting education as a proxy of income, it 
implies that women’s wages have a positive association with fertility at least among women who 
postpone their childbearing until 30. Vere (2007) finds that college-educated women born in the 
1970s are having more children as well as participating less in the labor market than their 
counterparts born in the end of the baby boom using data from the March Supplement to the CPS 
1964-2006. Increasing heterogeneity within women may imply that women in different life chances 
would react differently when their wages are changing. McLananhan (2004) shows that greater 
disparities occur in resources for childbearing in the second demographic transition that began in 
1960s. She argues that the first transition is relatively universal by social class, whereas the second 
transition has affected classes differently. The negative relationship could change, at least to a 
specific group.  
This research uses the discrete time hazard model using the National Longitudinal Study 
of Youth 1979: 1981-2006. The data has two merits. In the NLSY79, ages at the first interview were 
14-22 and they were 41-47 at 2006 wave. As the respondents reached their 40’s, the data could 
show the entire trajectory of their fertility. It helps to answer the question – who succeeded in 
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catching up with delayed childbearing at later ages and who did not? The other merit is that 
NLSY79 has detailed information on women’s work history. It records the first and last week of 
women’s job and their hourly wages at every wave. This enables to study the effect of “time-
varying” current income on their fertility. 
My hypothesis is that only those who are highly compensated among highly educated 
women can have children at older ages, which shows that only the economically successful women 
who postpone their childbearing for increased education and a successful career can have as many 
children as less educated women who have childbearing from the earlier ages. 
 
How do Women’s Wages Affect Their Fertility? 
Sociological Approach: Role Incompatibility 
Sociologists have focused on role incompatibility between workers and mothers 
(McDonald 2000; Morgan 2003; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996). Women are working in two greedy 
institutions – their family and their job (Coser 1974). These institutions demand considerable depth 
of efforts which is indivisible and frequently asks a full-time commitment. 
 In modern societies, the workplace is not child-friendly and usually does not allow 
children to be present. The workplace is geographically separated from home. It is ruled by a strict 
work ethic and the time regulation. Most women must leave home at a given hour and cannot take 
care of their child at their job.  
Childrearing demands the time and attention of the caregivers. This demand is the highest 
in infancy and diminishes as the child grows up. Especially for the first few months after childbirth, 
in the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act passed in 1993 allows workers to enjoy up 
to 12 weeks of unpaid leave without worrying about job security for the birth and care of the 
newborn child or adoption. But the regulation applies only to full-time workers (at least 1250 hours 
of service during the previous year) who are employed in a business which has 50 employees or 
more. Workers in a small company or part-time workers are not eligible to take the leave. They are 
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also likely to be at low-paid jobs. In the United States, maternity leave is nearly always unpaid 
(Waldfogel 1998). So, even among eligible workers, if they cannot afford the unpaid leave, they 
cannot use it. The average duration of the leave is 20 weeks on an average in the United States; 
(Waldfogel 1998). After the leave, mothers must decide if they wish to return to their jobs or if they 
wish to find alternative resources to complete a mother’s work - taking care of her children. 
 The role incompatibility could be lessened if a mother could access resources to aid in 
childbearing, childrearing and related household chores. Rindfuss et al (2007) find a positive effect 
of child care availability on childbearing using Norwegian register data. In the United States, child 
care is readily available and acceptable, but affordability is in question. According to the annual 
report of National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies, average prices for a 4 
year old child in a child care center in the United States is $3,794 to $10,920 a year in fees in 2006 
(NACCRRA 2007). The price for an infant is even higher than that; $4,388 to $14,647. They report 
that the average childcare fees for two children exceed the median rent cost and average monthly 
mortgage payment. In order to afford to use daycare or to hire a nanny, women must postpone 
childbearing until after they save enough money or to move into higher-paying jobs. 
 
Sociological Approach: Value of Children 
How can it be explained that low income women decide to have children, even though 
they must pay a sizable amount of costs? Friedman and her colleagues (Friedman, Hechter, and 
Kanazawa 1994) answer this puzzle using the parent’s desire for children. They maintain that 
having a child gives parents many values such as uncertainty reduction and enhancement of marital 
solidarity. Becoming a parent is an irreversible event and it will reduce uncertainty by establishing 
recurrent and tied social relations. Children might reduce some types of uncertainty but at the same 
time they could generate others types. When people become parents, they would start to worry 
about their children’s health, academic achievement, his or her career and so forth. However, there 
is a biased cognitive tendency that actors downplay risks or hazards which they experience 
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voluntarily and/or are somewhat controllable. Most parents choose to become parents before 
conception or during pregnancy. Parents believe they could help their children and guide them in 
the right direction. In this way, the perceived reduction of uncertainty could be larger than the 
concerns on newly generated uncertainty. 
Becker’s economic theory on fertility concerns the fertility of “people who already have 
decided to have children”. But, before the decision, “rational people must compare the expected 
value of a child with that of other goods” (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 1996). Another 
interesting argument is that the need for this value is different across actor’s economic situations. 
Low income women who have fewer alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty may be more 
vulnerable to external changes. It may lead them to bear children in early ages. The more the value 
of children is preferred, the more women are likely to decide to have children. Friedman and her 
colleagues apply this theory only to developed countries where children represent a net economic 
cost to their parent. 
 
Economic Approach: Substitution Effect (Opportunity Cost) vs. Income Effect 
The question of how each woman distributes her time between childbearing and market 
work can be analyzed within a framework of the New Home Economics (Becker 1974; Becker 
1991). The New Home Economics maintains that the time of the family member is a scarce 
resource and that economic theory could be applicable to behavior outside of the monetary market, 
for example, the decision to have children. The factors affecting childbearing could be divided into 
demand side and supply side. 
On the demand side, women’s income has two kinds of effects on fertility, which have 
opposing directional effect. The one is income effect and the other is substitution effect. Children are 
not free. Parents need to buy food and clothes for their children. They may need to hire a babysitter, 
pay the fee for a daycare center, and visit medical services. An increasing woman’s income means 
she has more power to afford such resources and therefore increase the likelihood of having more 
39 
children.  
At the same time, growing women’s income could lower the likelihood of having more 
children. Substitution effect is that when the price of one good increases, a consumer will buy 
different goods since the first one has become relatively expensive. In the New Home Economics, 
the former is the price of having a child measured by opportunity cost. That is, the relative price of 
childbearing is mainly decided by changes in the value of the mother’s time, because mother’s time 
and efforts are the major component of the cost for the childbearing and rearing. If the value of the 
mother’s time is increasing, the relative price of children will rise. If a mother is expecting an 
increase in her wages, the relative price of children will go up and therefore, she will be likely to 
reduce her fertility. Women’s opportunity cost consists of current wage as well as future wages 
which may be penalized by motherhood. During the leave for childrearing, her human capital could 
depreciate and her skills could become out-dated. This could cause her to lose a matching-job rent, 
which is enjoying at the current job. If the substitution effect is bigger than the income effect, a 
woman would decide not to have children when her wage grows and vice versa.  
Usually less educated women have a larger substitution effect. This may originate from the 
fact that the weight of the substitution effect is different. The expected income of less educated 
women will be smaller. They are more prone to marry less educated men who also suffer from low 
wages. Then, working for the woman may not be an option but mandatory in order to make two 
ends meet. But if her husband already has enough income to support them both, or if the family had 
enough income from their wealth, the increased amount of women’s wage does not have the 
substitution effect at the full degree. That is, substitution effect is a function of not only women’s 
income but also the degree of significance of women’s income on total family income. For less 
educated women, growing income may be fully reflected in the substitution effect, which is bigger 
than the income effect. It makes them have fewer children when they earn more. To highly educated 
women, growing income will have substitution effect in part, so their substitution effect could be 
smaller than the income effect. This will make them have more children when they earn more. 
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Supply Sides: How Long Can We Wait? 
 Women’s wage can be associated with the supply side of fertility. Borg (Borg 1989) argues 
that household income and fertility seem negatively associated. But when the net price of having a 
child and the supply sides are controlled, the household income effect becomes positive.  
Women’s fecundity has a limited life span from menarche (early teens) to menopause (late 
forties or early fifties) assuming there is no extraneous cause of sterility (Bongaarts and Potter 
1983). To stock human capital for higher earnings, women may postpone childbearing at young 
ages and choose better education and career establishment. During the delay, the risks of 
reproductive impairment could increase. This risk rises moderately until the mid-thirties and then it 
increases sharply (McFalls 1990). Though many women could have a healthy childbearing in their 
late thirties and even forties, some of them will be childless or have fewer children than they 
expected due to the impaired fecundity during the delay. 
Though most conception difficulties and miscarriages arise from unknown reasons and are 
indifferent to economic status, some of them could be prevented by proper medical treatments. For 
example, fibroid tumors of the uterus, which is found often in women in their 30s and 40s can 
generate a miscarriage if the tumor is large and bulges into the uterine cavity. These fibroid tumors 
can be easily diagnosed in gynecological exam and removed by medical surgery without 
impairment to fecundity. In this sense, women who delays childbearing and have affordable 
preventive and proper medical services are likely to bear children at later ages as they expected. 
 
Data and Method 
I will use the data from National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979. It is a national 
longitudinal sample of 12,686 men and women in the United States. The data has been collected 
annually until 1993 and then bi-annually from then on. At every round, it asks for the respondents’ 
work history – the first and the last days of the jobs they have had between surveys and their hourly 
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wages, and fertility history - date of each childbearing.  
The data is limited to women with 22 or over. Considering 2 years of a wait time until the 
conception and gestation period, childbearing before 22 is assumed to be intended before 20. As the 
purpose of this study is to find a causal effect of wage on fertility, unintentional childbearing should 
not be considered. Assuming that most teenage pregnancies are unintentionally, many teenagers are 
not employed and therefore there is lack of wage information, any childbearing before the age of 22 
is excluded from the sample. After further excluding military oversample, the final sample size will 
be 3544 women and 42197 measures. 
It should be noted that the data has a specific time span of cohorts who were born during 
the years 1957 through 1964. At the first survey in 1979, they were 14 to 21 and at the most recent 
survey in 2006, they were 41 to 47. Many of them have reached menopause or are very close to it. 
It is a very unique opportunity which enables the researcher to trace if a respondent simply 
postpone childbearing to her later ages or whether she has forgone having children altogether until 
she arrives at the end of the fecundible period. 
Left-truncation could be problematic because of the observational study setting. Left-
truncation happens where “the times individuals become at risk do not necessarily coincide with the 
start of the observation period” (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Respondents, who have 
previously had a child, are not eligible for the study. If there is no correction, there will be sample 
selection - the sample will consist only of survivors and it will make the hazard of childbearing 
underestimated. To avoid this bias, women who were older than 22 at the start of the observation 
period are excluded from the sample.  
 
Table 2.1 here 
 
Model Specification and Measures 
logit h(tij)= β0 + [α1(Ageij-21)+ α2(Ageij-21)2] + β1 X1i + β2 X2ij 
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Where i indexes individual women and j indexes time. 
X1i are time-invariant covariates and are X2ij time-varying covariates. 
 
I will use a discrete time hazard model. The duration begins at age 22, which is equivalent 
to the first year of duration. As the baseline hazard increases toward their mid-20s then decreases 
thereafter, squared duration is added. It is simpler and shows a statistically significant better fit than 
the model with age-dummy variables according to log likelihood test.    
Variables are constructed as of May 1st instead of the interview date to balance the data.  
As NLSY79 recorded each week of employment status and their wage, and the exact date of 
childbearing, the variable modification can be accomplished easily. 
The dependent variable will be the probability of having a second child. Women who 
suffer from economic hardship or who expect a higher standard of living compared to their wages 
may have one child but fail to have a second. Having a second child means achieving average 
fertility in the United States. In this sense, the second birth should draw more notice (Torr and Short 
2004). Among 3544 women, 2825 women have experienced their first birth during the survey 
period and 2098 women have experienced their second birth. 185 women who reports inconsistent 
dates of childbearing are dropped.  
As independent covariates, race and education will be used. Race is categorized into three 
groups – Hispanic, Black, and Non-Hispanic & Non-Black. The reference category will be Non-
Hispanic & Non-Black. 
Instead of current education, education at age 30 is used. Assuming that most young 
women, who past their 20s, can predict how long they plan to be in school and can adjust their life 
plan including childbearing accordingly, education at 30 can be a better measure of expected 
education. There is also less change in education over 30. Education is categorized into four groups 
– Less than high school (less than 12 years), high school diploma (12 years), some college 
experience (13 to 15 years), and college degree or higher (more than 16 years). 
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How to Measure Wages: Current Income vs. Permanent Income 
A key independent covariate will be women’s wage. Women’s wage will be measured in 
two ways – current wage and wage at 40. Wage at 40 is a time-invariant covariate and current wage 
is a time-varying covariate. All the wages will be converted to log hourly wages in 2006 dollars. If 
the hourly wage is less than 1 dollar or more than 200 dollars in 2006 dollars, it will be regarded as 
an outlier.  
There is a disagreement over which income is more critical to decide a current 
consumption. Keynes postulates that a current consumption depends only on a current income, 
while Milton Friedman postulates that a permanent income is the relevant determinant of a current 
consumption (Bhalla 1979; Friedman 1957). 
Freedman and Thornton (Freedman and Thornton 1982) study the relationship between 
husband’s current income and expected fertility. They point out the complexity in formulating a 
permanent income because young couples may give different values to the expected income at 
different points in time. Heckman and Walker (Heckman and Walker 1990) study the relationship 
between current female wage and the timing and spacing of births. They maintain that wages are 
uncertain and current wages are sufficient for measuring future wages. 
On the contrary, Friedman (Friedman 1957) notices the volatile characteristics of wages 
and argues that the changing wage consists of two parts – permanent and transitory. An individual 
tends to maintain a steady standard of living offsetting temporarily fluctuation. If an individual 
expects to her wage to increase in the future, her living standard could be higher than if a rise 
income were not expected. He called such an income as a permanent income. 
There are many ways to measure a permanent income. The accumulated total wage till age 
40 is one way. The expected wage at age 40 is another. Fleisher and Rhodes (Fleisher and Rhodes Jr 
1979) use an average lifetime wage. They measure women’s median earnings in the longest held 
job prior to the first child’s birth as permanent income. Bollen et al. (Bollen, Glanville, and 
Stecklov 2002) suggest using the latent variable to measure the permanent income. 
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A current wage is likely to be unstable and transitory. But an individual’s consumption is 
limited by the level of her current wage. When a woman suffers from the economic hardship, it is 
be a reasonable assumption that she will postpone or lessen expenditures.  
More importantly, wage at 40 is vulnerable to reversed causality. The overall negative 
relationship between wage and childbearing may happen not because high wages yield less 
childbearing but because motherhood lowers women’s wages. It is known that having a baby has a 
negative effect on woman’s wage that is called motherhood wage penalty (Anderson, Binder, and 
Krause 2002; Budig and England 2001; Waldfogel 1997). Anderson et al (Anderson, Binder, and 
Krause 2002) find that college graduates suffer from a large motherhood wage penalty while 
women who do not have a high school diploma do not receive much of the penalty. 
Most childbearing happens before age 40, when the permanent income is measured. It is 
illogical to assume that future income affects any past decisions of childbearing. On the contrary, 
the volatile characteristic of current income suggests that the future is uncertain, and any decision 
should be made based on the current situation. 
In this sense, current wages are preferred to trace the causality with childbearing as they 
appear in a timely fashion. Current wage will lag by two year considering a 9 month gestation 
period plus several months of waiting until conception to avoid simultaneity of cause and effect. 
Another reason that current (lagged) wage is not popular in studying the relationship 
between wage and fertility is data availability. It is not available in cross sectional data. Even in a 
longitudinal data, wage variable is likely to be not answered. Fortunately, NLSY79 is a longitudinal 
data set with a relatively small number of missings at hourly wage. Among measures of which age 
is 20 or more and employed, only 3.2% is missing. 
Two methods are adapted to estimate current hourly wage when it is not available. One is 
used when a respondent is not employed. In this case, it is assumed that her earning potential is the 
same as the most recent wage job. For example if she earned 8 dollars per hour 2 years ago from the 
most recent previous job and has not employed hereafter, her current earning potential will be 8 
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dollars per hour. As her human capital is likely to depreciate during the leave from the labor market, 
it could exaggerate her earning potential. If she has never held a wage paying job in any previous 
years, her wage will be 0. The other is used when a respondent does not provide an answer for her 
wage even though she has paid jobs. In this case, if her previous and next wages are available, her 
current wage will be the average of them. If her wage is missing more than two rounds in a row, she 
will be dropped from the sample. 
This paper will use wage at age 40 as a proxy of permanent income, and two year lagged 
hourly wage as a proxy of a current income. 
 
What if There is an Extraneous Variable Which Affect Her Wages and Childbearing: Endogeneity 
Issue 
 
Endogeneity happens when an independent variable is correlated with the error term. 
Wages could be endogenous to fertility if extraneous variables affect the childbearing and women’s 
wages. NLSY79 contains variables which measure attitude on respondents’ future fertility and job 
aspiration. I will use 4 of them. Except for the desired number of children which was measured in 
1982, all other variables are measured in 1979. The desired number of children by a respondent 
measures fertility expectation by asking the question: “HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU 
WANT TO HAVE ALTOGETHER?” The average is 2.24 children. Attitude on traditional family 
role is rated by the woman’s response to the statement: “IT IS MUCH BETTER FOR EVERYONE 
CONCERNED IF THE MAN IS THE ACHIEVER OUTSIDE THE HOME AND THE WOMAN 
TAKES CARE OF THE HOME AND FAMILY.” If she strongly disagrees, she should choose 1. If 
strongly agrees, she should choose 4. The average score is 1.99 which is the middle of the two 
stances. The question to measure future expectation is “WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE 
DOING WHEN YOU ARE 35 YEARS OLD?” Zero is coded for having a job and one is coded for 
married, stay with family. Most respondents choose zero and only 20% choose MARRIED, 
FAMILY. The question to measure ability expectation to achieve occupation aspiration at age 35 is 
“WHAT DO YOU THINK YOUR CHANCES ARE OF GETTING INTO THIS TYPE OF WORK 
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/DO YOU THINK THEY ARE EXCELLENT, GOOD, FAIR OR POOR?” 1 represents excellent 
and 4 represents poor. The average score is 2.07. 
By adding these variables, I expect attitudes, which could affect fertility and career 
aspiration, are controlled. 
 
Results 
Table 2.2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between number of births and 
women’s hourly wages by education from National Longitudinal Study of Youth79 (NLSY79): 
1979-2006. As they include the observations after the events of interest such as the second birth, the 
number of measures is much larger than that in the regression model. The first two rows are from 
longitudinal data of which age is limited to 22 or over. This signifies that respondents could be 
counted multiple times. Wages at 40 and 2 year lagged wages are negatively associated with 
number of births but, the decreasing linear relationship is weaker in 2 year lagged wage. When the 
data is broken down by education, the negative correlation of wage at 40 and fertility is the largest 
for the least educated group and the smallest for the group with only a high school diploma. The 
correlation between 2 year lagged wage and fertility shows monotonous trends by education. The 
least educated group shows the most negative relationship and its effect decreases towards the more 
educated group. The group with a college degree or higher even shows a positive correlation. 
The next three rows shows correlations gauged in three points of ages – 30, 35, and 40. As 
it is a correlation of a specific age, respondents are counted only once. Overall it is clear that there 
is a negative association. The relationship is stronger at a younger age. The shrinking negative 
correlation implies that women with a higher income may postpone their childbearing until after 
building their career or until after they can lessen the difficulty of childbearing using their earned 
income in later years. Interestingly, the correlations are different by education. Among the least 
educated women, the correlation is neither substantially nor statistically significant at age 30 and 35. 
Unlike other groups, the negative correlation grows toward old ages. The largest correlation is 
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found for women with some college experience. They spend their early 20s in the school but may 
not be rewarded for their investment in the labor market. High school graduates who enter the labor 
market in early ages could build their careers and families quickly.  
 
Table 2.2 here. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the smoothed hazard estimates and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of 
having a second child by education. The plot of smoothed hazard estimates shows that all four 
estimates draw unimodal trend. The difference is when the peak is and how big it is. Women who 
have less than a high school education have the highest hazard estimates of second childbearing at 
their mid 20s (.1349 at 25), which is approximately four times larger than the hazard of women 
with a college degree or higher until 27 (.122 vs. .037 at 27). In their late 20s, high school graduates 
and some college experienced women record the peak of hazard (.093 at 27 vs. .074 at 28) and then 
the modest declines of a similar magnitude. Unlike the other three groups of whose graphs are 
positively skewed with the long right tales, women with a college degree or higher show low hazard 
estimates in their 20s. Instead, from the age of 30, their hazard estimates are the largest. After 
recording the peak at 32, their hazard estimates remain notably larger than the other three groups’ 
for all of the 30s. 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates show that the number of women not having a second 
child decreases sharply as education decreases. It generates a sizable gap between highly educated 
women and less educated women during their late 20s and early 30s. From their 30s, women with a 
college degree or higher lower their survival estimates. Therefore, from the late 30s the gap gets 
smaller, even though more education connects to the higher probability of remaining not-having 
second childbearing. 
 
Figure 2.1 here. 
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Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show the coefficients from the discrete hazard model of a second 
childbearing on hourly wage and other control variables2. At each table, model 1 is the basic model 
including wage, duration and race dummy variables. Model 2 adds attitude variables. Model 3 adds 
the education dummy variables excluding wage. Model 4 incorporates wage and education at the 
same time. Model 5 has the interaction terms between wage and education assuming that wage 
effects are different by education. 
 
Table 2.3 here. 
 
Table 2.3 shows second childbearing and wage at 40. At model 1, I regress the probability 
of having a second childbearing on wage at 40, controlling for duration and race dummy variables. 
It turns out that wage at 40 is negatively associated with first birth. The coefficient of wage at 40 is 
-.018 and it is highly significant (p<.001). It is .982 in odds ratio. The wage effect is almost the 
same after controlling for attitude variables additionally. Model 3 shows that how education is 
associated with the probability of having a second childbearing. To some college experienced 
women, the estimated odds of having a second childbearing are 75% of the odds for women with a 
high school diploma. Women with a college degree or higher are more negatively associated with 
fertility when compared to high school graduates. The odds for the least educated women are 27% 
higher than the odds for high school graduates. In model 4, the negative coefficient of wage at 40 
decreases by 40% compared to model 2. It is reasonable because part of the wage effect can be 
explained by education effect; less educated women who have a higher probability of having a 
second childbearing are likely to earn smaller wages. Model 5 adds interactions but its model fit 
does not significantly improve from model 4 according to the Log Likelihood test (p=.86). 
 
                                                     
2 The discrete time hazard models of a first childbearing on hourly are found at the appendix. 
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Table 2.4 here. 
 
At Table 2.4, hourly wage is a time-varying covariate, 2 year lagged. Unlike wage at 40, 
time-varying wage shows a small positive but statistically insignificant effect at model 1 and 2. An 
interesting finding is at model 4 and 5. At model 4, hourly wage has a positive effect (β= .013, 
p<.001). But after adding the interaction terms, the coefficient changes to the negative effect (β = -
.018, p=.009). The model fit of model 5 is significantly improved from model 4 according to the 
Log Likelihood test (p<.001). Considering the interaction terms, the direction of hourly wage is 
different from education. The combined coefficient is at the lowest for women with a high school 
diploma (β = -.018). For women with less than a high school diploma, the combined coefficient is 
still negative (β = -.006). For women with some college experience, the combined coefficient is 
positive (β = .010). For women with a college degree or higher, the positive effect is more larger (β 
= .034) 
 
Figure 2.2 here 
 
Plots of survival function of a second childbearing for the high (75th percentile) and the 
low (25th percentile) wages among the same education level are presented in figure 2.2. It is a 
predicted probability made from the model 5 in table 2.4. It is not recommended to use observed 
distribution among the remaining women in each time period because it could artificially lower the 
hazard in the later years by sample selection (Singer and Willett 2003). Instead, the 75th percentile 
and the 25th percentile wages in each education category are obtained not from the person-period 
data but from the original full data which does not remove any individual who experiences the 
event – second childbearing. Race is set to Non-Hispanic Non-Black, and attitudes are set to the 
average of each education group. The solid line represents the 75th percentile hourly wage and the 
dashed line represents the 25th percentile hourly wage from the bottom in the same educational 
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attainment group. The survival functions of the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile earner are not 
much different except for women with a college degree or higher. Among women with a college 
degree or higher, a 75th percentile earner would have sizably lower predicted probability of having 
second child than a 25th percentile earner. 
 
Discussion 
Using a nationally representative data from NLSY79: 1979-2006, I have researched how 
women’s hourly wages affect their childbearing. I found a negative relationship between women’s 
hourly wage and fertility. But the findings are not consistent across education levels. Women who 
have a high school diploma or less are less likely to have children when their wages increase. But 
women who have some college experience or a college degree are likely to have children when 
their wages increase. In other words, when their income rises, less educated women have a bigger 
substitution effect, whereas highly educated women have a bigger income effect. Or, for less 
educated women who are likely to be in the low paying jobs, the rise of income is not large enough 
to lessen role incompatibility. Only for highly educated women who are likely to be in high paying 
decent jobs, the rise of income can be used as a resource for reconciling the mother’s and worker’s 
roles. 
Less educated women are likely to start having children in their earlier ages and have a 
larger number of children altogether. Some college-experienced or college-educated women are 
likely to postpone the childbearing and have a smaller number of children. Among them, only 
highly compensated women are likely to have children at older ages. It is much clearer among 
college educated women. The gap of predicted probability to have a second child between high 
earner (75th percentile from the bottom within the same education category) and low earner (25th 
percentile) is the largest in the group with college degree or higher.  
The findings mainly come from the relationship between fertility and 2 year lagged 
income. I fail to find an interaction between education and wage at 40. 2 year lagged income is a 
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measure of current income, while wage at 40 is a measure of permanent income. Even though the 
correlation with fertility is stronger in the case of wage at 40, I recommend using 2 year lagged 
income. Future is uncertain; to the contrary, current wage set the boundary women can consume. 
More importantly, 2 year lagged income is in timely fashion of cause and effect. A study using 
future wages as a permanent income may exaggerate the negative relationship between fertility and 
women’s wage. 
It should be noted that this study is built on the data of which respondents were born in 
1957-1964. They were 41-47 years old as of 2006, at the last year of the survey. The more recent 
cohorts may have different reaction when their income changes.  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Year 1992 6.63 1981 2006 
Age 30.19 6.45 22 47 
First Childbearing 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Second Childbearing 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Hourly Wage, time-varying 13.38 9.01 0 98.5 
Hourly Wage at 40 18.20 11.94 0 97.8 
Attitude 
Number of Desired Children 2.24 1.35 0 16 
Attitude on Traditional Family 
: 1=least, 4=strong 1.99 0.51 1 4 
Expectation at 35: 0=job, 1=family 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Expected Ability for Aspired  
Occupation at 35: 1=excellent, 4=poor 
2.07 
 
0.79 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Race 
Hispanic 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Black 0.27 0.44 0 1 
White: reference category 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Education 
Less than High School 0.08 0.27 0 1 
High School: reference category 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Some College Experience 0.28 0.45 0 1 
College Degree or Higher 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Number of Women 3544 
Number of Measures 42197       
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Table 2.2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Number of Births and Women's Hourly 
Wages, NLSY79: 1979-2006 
   All 
Less than 
High1 
High  
School2 
Some 
College3 College4 
At Longitudinal Setting5 
    Wage at 40 -.235*** -.137*** -.092*** -.123*** -.120*** 
  2 Year Lagged -.106*** -.080*** -.031*** -.015*  .174*** 
 At A Specific Age 
At 30 -.241*** -.022  -.140*** -.168*** -.137*** 
At 35 -.183*** -.042  -.104*** -.170*** -.072* 
At 40 -.161*** -.132*  -.086** -.141*** -.080* 
Number of Women/Measures 
Wage at 40 68173 9277 29125 17338 12219 
2 Year Lagged 80307 10640 32730 19506 14815 
30 4444 459 1838 1171 976 
35 3797 379 1591 1042 785 
40 3474 350 1474 945 705 
* p<.05;    ** p<.01;    *** p<.001 
1 Less than High means she does not have high school diploma. 
2 High School means she has a high school diploma. 
3 Some College means she has some college experiences but does not graduate it. 
4 College means she has a college degree or higher. 
5 Individuals are limited to age 22 or over. Due to its longitudinal setting, they could be counted multiple 
times. 
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Figure 2.1. Plots of Women’s Hazard Estimates and Survival Estimates of Second Childbearing by 
Education, NLSY79:1979-2006. 
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Table 2.3. Coefficients from Discrete Hazard Model of Second Birth on Hourly Wage at 40 
and Control Variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Wage at 40 -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.009 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
(Age-21) 0.167*** 0.179*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
(Age-21)2 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.125* -0.126 -0.092 -0.139* -0.140* 
(0.060) (0.065) (0.061) (0.066) (0.066) 
Hispanic 0.189** 0.173* 0.08 0.139 0.137 
(0.066) (0.073) (0.068) (0.074) (0.074) 
White (Reference Category) - - - - 
Number of Expected Birth 0.073*** 0.099*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Attitdue on Traditional Family 0.140* 0.128* 0.075 0.077 
(0.056) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) 
Expectation at 35 0.12 0.087 0.074 0.072 
(0.067) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) 
Expected Ability at 35 0.002 -0.009 -0.021 -0.022 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
Less than High School 0.235** 0.184 0.322 
(0.089) (0.099) (0.192) 
   High School (Reference Category) - - - 
Some College Experience -0.299*** -0.283*** -0.269* 
(0.062) (0.068) (0.136) 
College Degree or Higher -0.538*** -0.430*** -0.401* 
(0.069) (0.080) (0.156) 
Wage * Less than High School -0.013 
(0.016) 
   Wage * High School (Reference Category) -
Wage * Some College Experience -0.001 
(0.007) 
Wage * College Degree or Higher -0.002 
(0.007) 
Constant -2.848*** -3.392*** -3.485*** -3.202*** -3.226*** 
(0.085) (0.172) (0.149) (0.175) (0.185) 
N 35984 31002 36241 31002 31002 
LL         -6559 -5662 -6715 -5641 -5640 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
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Table 2.4. Coefficients from Discrete Hazard Model of Second Birth on Lagged Hourly Wage 
and Control Variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hourly Wage, 2 Year Lagged 0.003 0.004 0.013*** -0.018**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
(Age-21) 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.160*** 0.164***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
(Age-21)2 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.027 -0.042 -0.092 -0.064 -0.093 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Hispanic 0.181** 0.134* 0.08 0.083 0.085 
(0.061) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
   White (Reference Category) - - - - 
Number of Expected Birth 0.077*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Attitdue on Traditional Family 0.243*** 0.128* 0.145** 0.128* 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Expectation at 35 0.138* 0.087 0.084 0.095 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Expected Ability at 35 0.04 -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Less than High School 0.235** 0.266** 0.087 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.162) 
   High School (Reference Category) - - - 
Some College Experience -0.299*** -0.319*** -0.609***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.124) 
College Degree or Higher -0.538*** -0.595*** -1.326***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.128) 
Wage * Less than High School 0.012 
(0.016) 
   Wage * High School (Reference Category) 
Wage * Some College Experience 0.028** 
(0.009) 
Wage * College Degree or Higher 0.052***
(0.008) 
Constant -3.164*** -3.990*** -3.485*** -3.614*** -3.247***
(0.070) (0.148) (0.149) (0.153) (0.167) 
N 42197 36241 36241 36241 36241 
LL          -7875 -6758 -6715 -6707 -6682 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
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Figure 2.2. Predicted Probability of Remaining Not-Having Second Childbearing of Women from 
Table 2.4, Model 5. The Solid line is for 75th Hourly Wage and the Dashed line is for 25th Hourly 
Wage from the Bottom in the Same Educational Attainment Group, using NLSY79: 1979-2006. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TEMPO CHANGES AND LOW FERTILITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
Introduction 
In the 2000s South Korea has experienced a plummet in total fertility rates around 1.1. It 
has caused many social concerns – a rapidly aging population with an increasing burden of medical 
and pension resources for the elderly, a shortage in the labor force, especially young workers and an 
ebbing vitality in economy with declining effective demands.  
A Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the most common measure of fertility level. It is composed 
of the interplay of two components; a change of the number of births (quantum) and the shift of the 
timing of those births (tempo). When the timing of births is deferred, the TFR would decrease; 
when the timing of births advances, the TFR would increase. In this way, a TFR may change even 
though there is no quantum change as long as there is a tempo change. Previous research on the 
fertility decline in Korea has been conducted with a quantum driven perspective, and little has been 
conducted based on the tempo perspective (Choe, Retherford, and Kim 2004; Eun 2002; Eun 2006; 
Kim 2005). 
Tempo effect is one of the key reasons causing the lowest-low fertility3 in Southern and 
Eastern European countries (Bongaarts 2002; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Lutz, O'Neill, and 
Scherbov 2003; Lutz and Skirbekk 2005; Philipov and Kohler 2001; Sobotka 2004). They agree 
that the current low fertilities are exaggerated by sizable negative tempo effects. Lutz, O’Neill and 
Scherbov (2003) suggest that the tempo effect is around .3 births in 10 EU countries. If the tempo 
effects were removed instantly, European countries could escape from the lowest-low fertility rates. 
                                                     
3 Lowest-low fertility is defined as a level of the total fertility rate at or below 1.3 (Kohler, H. P., F. 
C. Billari, and J. A. Ortega. 2002. "The Emergence of Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe During the 
1990 s." Population and Development Review 28:641-680.) 
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It should be noticed that all fertility declines are not necessarily accompanied by negative 
tempo effects. A fertility decline could happen if a quantum decline is very large and a negative 
tempo effect does not fully offset it. In Russia the fertility decline in the early 1990s happened 
while the mean mothers’ age at birth decreased (Philipov and Kohler 2001). A similar phenomenon 
could be found in Korea in the early 1980s when its TFR arrived at the replacement level for the 
first time. 
The research purpose of this paper is to quantify the tempo effect on the recent fertility 
decline. Has the tempo effect served for the recent fertility decline in South Korea? If then, how 
important is it? By answering these questions, this paper will suggest the extent to which the current 
fertility decline is a tempo-driven phenomenon. I expect the disentanglement between quantum and 
tempo effects will serve for a better understanding of recent fertility changes. 
I will decompose the tempo and quantum effects by estimating adjusted TFR introduced 
by Bongaarts and Feeney (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Adjusted TFR could show a counterfactual 
fertility rate in a given year when there is no tempo change comparing to adjacent years. The 
assumptions on the Bongaarts and Feeney method are tested, and adjusted TFR with variance 
effects suggested by Kholer and Philipov (Kohler and Philipov 2001) is also estimated. 
 
Figure 3.1. here 
Figure 3.2. here 
 
South Korean Context 
During the industrialization in the 1960s and the 1970s, South Korea tried to lower its 
fertility to the replacement level and achieved this goal successfully by the mid 1980s. After Korea 
reached a TFR of 2.1 in 1983, its TFR has modestly fluctuating for a decade. From 1995 it resumed 
the decline with a slow pace. Demographers widely had accepted that the first fertility transition 
came to an end and a new stage of stability would begin (Kim 2005). However, from 2000, it 
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started to plummet and reached a TFR of 1.08 in 2005.  
During the relative stability of the TFR after the mid 1980s, age-specific fertility rates 
(ASFRs) are undergoing remarkable changes. In 1985, the ASFR for ages 25-29 reached a peak and 
the ASFR for ages 20-24 reached to the second highest. In 1995, the ASFR for ages 20-24 
decreased to the half of that in year 1985. Instead the ASFR for ages 25-29 and 30-34 increased 
approximately by .2 births. In 2005 the ASFRs for ages 20-24 and ages 25-29 decreased by half but 
the ASFR for ages 30-34 increased slightly compared to the ASFR in 1995. During the past two 
decades, the ASFR for women in their 20s has declined significantly and the ASFRs for those in 
their 30s have shown little change or growth. 
Until the late 1990s there was less concern for the low fertility in South Korea. The lack of 
attention to declining fertility originated from the facts that (1) South Korea had suffered from rapid 
population growth for decades, 2) its TFR was fluctuating at a modest low fertility level of around 
1.6, and (3) there was a belief that the current low fertility was indebted to the strong family 
planning program and prevailing induced abortions. However, low fertility has become one of the 
hottest issues in South Korea, since it has plummeted into the lowest low fertility from year 2001.  
Most demographers agree that the economic crisis in 1997 made a huge effect on the 
current low fertility in South Korea (Choe, Retherford, and Kim 2004; Eun 2002; Eun 2006; Kim 
2005; Kim 2003; Tsuya and Bumpass 2004). Yet there is no consensus on how it yields any further 
decline. Some give more weight to ideological changes and others to structural changes. 
Some scholars (Choe, Retherford, and Kim 2004; Kim 2003; Tsuya and Bumpass 2004) 
stress the change of values and norms toward less or no children in the 1990s. Choe, Rethorford, 
and Kim (2004) found that men and women were less likely to believe that marriage is necessary in 
2000 (24 percent) compared to 1991 (30 percent). Women’s ideal age at their first marriage also 
shifted from 25.3 in 1991 to 26.7 in 2003. Kim et al. (2003) reported that the percent of people who 
think it is necessary to have children declined dramatically from 90% in 1991 to 58% in 2000. Their 
theories are similar to the second demographic transition (Van De Kaa 1987) in that South Korea 
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experienced a swing from altruistic to individualistic marriage and a greater stress on pairs rather 
than children, though cohabitation and childbearing out-of-wedlock is relatively rare in South 
Korea 
Other scholars (Eun 2002; Eun 2006) give more weight to structural changes. The facts 
that there is less change in the ideal number of children and that many women still expect to have 
two children support this theory. More women are well-educated and are participating in the labor 
force which is hampering childbearing due to an unchanged traditional women’s role. Eun (2002) 
argues that the changing labor market after the economic crisis is the most significant factor in 
explaining the rapid decline of fertility. The decreasing full-time/stable jobs and the increasing 
flexibility of the labor market makes youth take more time to establish careers and therefore, young 
adults are likely to postpone their marriage. Economic crises also threaten family economics and 
married people are likely to get divorced due to economic reasons. Consequently, economic crisis 
may lower fertility. Similar cases can be found in Central and Eastern European countries after the 
falls of Communist regimes (Kohler and Kohler 2002; Ranjan 1999).  
Both sides agree that the delayed marriage and childbearing is a key characteristic of the 
current fertility decline, but their perspectives are all quantum driven. They regard the delay as an 
intermediate variable and pay less attention to tempo effects separately. If a cohort TFR is of 
interest, tempo changes would have only transient effects and would not matter. But if a period TFR 
is of interest, tempo changes would have its own effect.  
 
Period TFR vs. Cohort TFR: Why Does the Tempo Effect Matter? 
A total fertility rate is the sum of age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs). There are two kinds 
of TFR: cohort TFR and period TFR. Following a woman from the beginning to the ending of her 
reproductive years is cohort completed fertility (cohort TFR). It shows the average number of 
children that women have during their lifetime. It can be recorded only after the subject group has 
passed the end of their reproductive years – usually in their late 40s. Therefore the cohort TFR is 
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useful to research the past changes but not suitable to examine the current situation. 
Period TFR is the sum of age-specific fertility rates recorded for a given population in a 
given year. It is calculated from a synthetic group of women who would follow the given ASFRs 
through their reproductive years. In this way, period TFR is able to record the current fertility level.  
Unlike cohort TFR which is decided solely by quantum changes, period TFR includes 
another factor - tempo changes. Figure 3 shows how tempo effect is related to period TFR and 
cohort TFR. Figure 3.a is a Lexus diagram which shows the way of calculating period TFR and 
cohort TFR. The cell of a column is the ASFR of a given time. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
there are no births before age 19 and after age 45. As the age category has 5 year intervals and the 
columns have also 5 year intervals, a cohort TFR is obtained by summing diagonal ASFRs. For 
example the cohort TFR of t-20 cohort (women who are 20-24 years old at time t-20) is the sum of 
grey ASFRs (2.0=5*(.1+.1+.1+.1+0)). A period TFR is the sum of column ASFRs (sum of a 
column=5*(.1+.1+.1+.1)) 
Before time t, all births happen when mothers are at age 20-39 with the same ASFRs. Let 
us imagine that there is a war at time t and every woman decides to shift towards later childbearing 
by 5 years and keeps the shift hereafter – all births will happen when mothers are at ages 25-44 with 
the same ASFRs. The ASFRs at time t would be 0. Therefore the period TFR in time t will be also 0. 
From time t+5, the period TFR rebounds and continues to 2.0. Interestingly there is no change in 
the cohort TFRs at those times. It is because that there is no change in the number of children 
women would have during their lifetime. The war at time t made women simply postpone their 
childbearing and they have childbearing in later years. Like this, a change in mother’s mean age at 
birth could affect period TFR but not cohort TFR 
 
Figure 3.3 here. 
 
It is unrealistic that all the delay will finalize in later childbearings. Some women will give 
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birth at later ages, but others will have fewer children than expected or may forgo having a child. 
Figure 3.b shows such a scenario. What if women still want to have two children in their lifetime? 
Due to the growing concerns to build a career and to evade current economic difficulty, they may 
decide to postpone having children. What if 80% of them finally succeed in having babies in their 
30s or even their 40s? The data in figure 4.b from year 1975 to 2005 is from the real vital statistics 
in South Korea but the data from after year 2005 is assumed arbitrarily in that the cohort TFRs 
should converge to 1.6. While the cohort TFR decreases gradually from 2.36 (1975 cohort) to 1.6 
(2005 cohort) by year 2025, the period TFRs have dropped rapidly to 1.08 in 2005 then rebound to 
1.6. This scenario shows that period TFR could be sizably different from cohort TFR and is volatile 
to tempo changes.  
Tempo perspective is useful not only to understand the current fertility changes but also to 
predict the future fertility. The postponement of childbearing cannot last forever. Women should 
decide whether to have children or not before they arrive at infecundible age. Low fertility driven 
by the tempo effect could rebound later when the tempo effect disappears or decreases if all other 
things remain constant. The fertility recoveries of the United States in the 1990s from the decades 
of below replacement level to the above replacement level fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998) 
and of the Netherlands from 1.53 in the mid-1990s to 1.72 in the early 2000s (Sobotka 2004) are 
accomplished while the rise of the mean age at birth stops. Thus the size of the tempo effect shows 
the potential of fertility rebound in the future.  
Two things should be considered. First, even if the postponement is likely to have a time 
limit, it is hard to tell when that limit will be reached. Japan has experienced the postponement of 
childbearing for decades though the speeds of this postponement have been fluctuating (Suzuki 
2006). The mean age at childbearing rose from age 28.1 in 1984 to 29.8 in 2003 and it is still 
growing.  
Secondly, it is too optimistic to think that the period TFR could rebound as much as the 
size of the tempo effect in the long run. The current decision of postponement of childbearing could 
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be finalized in simply delayed childbearing as well as fewer or no children than they expected.  
However, tempo-free TFR would be a better indicator of the level of the cohort TFR based 
on current fertility. It should be noted that tempo-free TFR is not a substitute of cohort fertility but 
still a period measure. Though, it is a better approximation of the cohort TFR (Sobotka 2004) and 
can give more information on the future of fertility changes than a conventional period TFR. 
 
Methods and Data 
Adj-TFR using Bongaarts and Feeney Methods 
Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) suggest adjusted TFR which shows “an accurate estimate of 
the total fertility rate that would be observed in the absence of changes in the timing of 
childbearing”(Bongaarts 2002). Adjusted TFR is a kind of counterfactual TFR which indicates TFR 
when tempo effects are removed. A conventional period TFR would be the same to an adj-TFR 
insofar as the childbearing ages are constant.  
As the mean age at childbearing could be affected not only by the change of timing but 
also composition of parity (birth order), Bongaarts and Feeney suggested applying their adjustment 
by parity separately. As a higher parity is likely to happen at later ages, a mean age at childbearing 
can be younger even when childbearing is delayed; if the effect of declining higher parity is greater 
than the effect of actual delay of childbearing.  
Their formula estimating a parity specific adjusted TFR is as below: 
 
Adj-TFRit = TFRit / (1 – rit) 
Where rit is the change in mean age at childbearing at parity i between the 
beginning and the end of the year t.  
  rit = dMAC(t)/dt 
= (MACt+1,i+MACt,i)/2 – (MACt-1,i +MACt,i)/2  = [(MACt+1,i – (MACt-1,i)/2] 
  where MACt,i is the mean age at childbearing at year t and parity i. 
 
  
To get the MAC at the beginning and end of year of t, the average of MAC at t and t-1 is 
calculated. Therefore, adj-TFRs of the beginning year and the last year in the dataset cannot be 
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estimated. 
 While some researchers criticize the Bongaarts and Feeney method (Kim and Schoen 2000; 
van Imhoff and Keilman 2000) in that its assumption is easy to be violated and it is not a true cohort 
measure. But many others support it because 1) the violation of the assumption is not critical and in 
many cases, adj-TFR is not sensitive to the assumption (Yi. and Land 2001), 2) Bongaarts and 
Feeney do not argue that adj-TFR is a substitute of cohort TFR and they admit it is a kind of a 
period measure (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Bongaarts and Feeney 2000) and 3) it is simplistic 
and useful to detangle quantum changes in period TFR from tempo effect (Kohler and Philipov 
2001; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Lutz and Skirbekk 2005; Sobotka 2004; Yang and Morgan 
2003; Yi. and Land 2001). 
 
Assumptions Tests 
Bongaarts and Feeney’s adj-TFR is based on the assumption that there is no age-period 
interaction. That is, when there is a shock to fertility, each age group should receive similar effects 
and its fertility should adjust in a proportionate way to keep the shape of the fertility schedule 
invariant. If the shape was modified, adj-TFR would be biased. Though the assumption is 
somewhat unrealistic, according to Zeng and Land(Yi. and Land 2001)’s sensitivity analysis, adj-
TFR is robust to the assumption. If the change in the shape is expected or the tempo changes more 
than .25 years(Yi. and Land 2002), the adjustment could be exaggerated. 
To justify the assumption, two approaches will be employed. First, the assumption of no 
age-period interaction will be tested as Philpov and Kholer (Philipov and Kohler 2001) did in their 
study about the tempo effects and the fertility decline in Eastern European countries. In their study, 
the fertility schedule is regarded as a survival schedule and compared with adjacent years’ 
schedules. If there is a crossing of the curves, it means an age group will act differently against 
extraneous impacts and the shape of fertility schedule will be changed. As the crossing may happen 
as a result of the random fluctuations, the statistical test will examine whether two survival 
68 
functions are equal.  
Secondly, adj-TFR with a variance effect (Kohler and Philipov 2001) that allows the 
inclusion of the effect of changing variance at the fertility schedule will be suggested.4 The 
increase of the mean age at childbearing is likely to go along with the increase in the variance of the 
fertility schedule. The variance change could imply a modification to the shape of the fertility 
schedule – the violation of non age-period interaction assumption. By incorporating variance 
changes in the TFR adjustment, a more robust adj-TFR can be obtained.  
 
Data 
To estimate adjusted-TFRs, age-specific data on the women’s population and data on the 
number of births by mothers’ age and birth orders are needed.  
The Korean government has used registered population data from 1992 to calculate the 
official TFR. As the registered population is the population at the end of a given year, mid-year 
population is available from 1993. On before 1993, the Korean government had used estimated 
population from its Census. I will use the same dataset from 1985 to 2006 
The numbers of births by mothers’ age and birth order from year 1985 to 2006 are 
obtained from the Korean Women’s Development Institute (http://www.kwdi.re.kr). The birth order 
is in four groups; first birth, second birth, third birth, and fourth or later birth. If birth order or 
mother’s age is unknown, such births are excluded. It makes the estimated TFRs smaller than the 
official TFRs but the difference is negligible. 
 
Results 
Figure 3.4 shows that the mean ages of childbearing (MAC) by birth order in South Korea 
have been growing from the mid-1980s continuously.  The fourth or later birth is not shown in the 
                                                     
4Hans-Peter Kohler’s programs (http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~hpkohler/data-and-
programs/bfvariance/bfvarianceprograms.html) are used to calculate the adjusted TFR with 
variance effect 
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graph. For details, see the appendix. The first MAC was 24.9 in 1985 and rose to 29.3 in 2006. The 
second MAC also rose from 26.5 in 1985 to 31.3 in 2006. The slope of first births gets steeper from 
1996, which means that women postponed their first childbearing with faster speed. The slope of 
second births gets steeper from 2000. The rising MAC implies a positive “r” of the Bongaarts-
Feeney method and a negative tempo effect.  
 
Figure 3.4. here 
 
As shown in Figure 5, “r” from all three birth orders decreased till the mid 1990s and then 
grew again till 2003. “r” of the first births tripled from .1 in 1991 to .3 in 2002. “r” of .1 means that 
a TFR without the tempo effect would be higher by 11% (=1/1-r) than the original TFR at the birth 
order. “r” of .2 means the TFR would be higher by 25%, and “r” of .3 means it would be higher by 
43%. “r” of the second births followed a similar pattern. In 1995, it recorded the lowest point at .12 
and then increased to .3 in 2003 and 2004. 1995 is when the TFR began to decrease from ten years 
of a standstill at around 1.6. The stable fertility with the declining tempo effects from 1985 to 1995 
implies that the fertility rates (quantum only) were actually on the decline. The growing negative 
tempo effect after 1995 implies that the recent fertility declines were tempo-driven phenomena and 
the declining speed was not as steep as the conventional period TFR showed. 2004 and 2005 show 
interesting phenomena. “r” of the first and second births shrinks to .2 while South Korea is still 
recording around 1.1 of the TFR. It is necessary to pay attention to see if it makes any further trend. 
 
Figure 3.5. here 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the adj-TFRs and the original TFRs from 1985 to 2005 in South Korea. 
The gap between the adj-TFR and the original TFR narrowed to .25 births by the mid 1990s when 
the tempo effect was the smallest. After 1995, the gap widened to .53 births in 2000. So if there is 
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no tempo distortion, its TFR would be around 2.0 and close to replacement level fertility till 2000. 
Such a huge tempo effect is larger than those in 10 countries in the European Union – .3 births 
(Lutz, O'Neill, and Scherbov 2003) and comparable to that of the Czech Republic in the mid 1990s 
(Philipov and Kohler 2001). 5 After 2000, the absolute size of the gap shrank to .41 births in 2004 
and .3 births in 2005. If the tempo effects are removed, Korean fertility will be well above the 
lowest-low fertility. But adj-TFRs are also on the sharp decline. It implies that the recent fertility 
decline into the lowest-low fertility level is accomplished initially by the surge of negative tempo 
effects. 
  
Figure 3.6. here 
 
Is the assumption that there is no age-period interaction violated? If the fertility schedule 
is changed, there is a crossing among the birth-free survival curves. I tested the first births curves 
and the second births curves from 2000 to 2003 when the differences between adjacent MACs are 
the largest; the difference ranges .28 to .31 years for the first birth and .22 to .35 for the second birth. 
As Figure 6 shows there is no crossing which means that as the extraneous impact changes each age 
group in the same way, the shape of fertility schedule is not changed. A Log-rank test and the 
Wilcoxon test for equality of survival functions are also performed. Holding the hypothetical 
sample size at 10,000, the null hypothesis that the survival functions are the same cannot be 
rejected.6 
 
                                                     
5 A comparison of the adj-TFRs between countries needs a special attention. The volume of tempo 
effects depends not only on r but also on TFR. Even though r is the same, the larger TFR would 
make a bigger gap between TFR and adj-TFR. So the comparison of tempo effects is reasonable 
only among countries where their TFRs are similar. Both of the low fertility countries in the Europe 
and Korea are at the lowest-low fertility. 
 
6 If the sample size is set at 100,000, the null hypothesis is rejected. The statistical tests are 
sensitive to the sample size. Large sample size could prove that the small differences exist and they 
are statistically significant. 
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Figure 3.7. here 
Figure 3.8. here 
 
 What will happen to adj-TFR if the variance change is considered? Figure 3.8 shows the 
gamma of the Kholer-Philipov method (Kohler and Philipov 2001), which is equivalent to r of the 
Bongaarts-Feeney method. At the first birth, the gamma is larger than the r from 1998 to 2000 and it 
is significantly smaller than in the early 2000s. At the second birth the gamma is smaller than r after 
1996. Both of them are converging to r in 2005. It implies that at the first birth, r after 2000 is 
overestimated and it is attributable not to tempo changes but to variance changes. Figure 3.9 shows 
adj-TFR with variance effect by birth orders. During the recent fertility decline after 2000, adj-TFR 
is a bit higher than adj-TFR with variance effect. It means that the fertility schedule changes toward 
a concentration with smaller variance; women are more likely to have children at the specific later 
ages, like their mid 30s. It exaggerates the tempo effects and true tempo-free TFR should be smaller 
than the estimated adj-TFR. 
 
Figure 3.9. here 
 
Will the Negative Tempo Effect decrease? 
The current negative tempo effect will decline for two reasons insofar as there are no 
further social changes. First, if the mothers’ age at childbearing is postponed by the effect of 
economic crisis and there is no further social change, it would be stabilized when the social causes 
that make women delay childbearing are fully reflected. To continue the further delay, successive 
social impact towards late childbearing is needed. Secondly, the choice of delayed childbearing 
should consider the “biological limit”. Women who want to postpone childbearing but not forego 
having children will do so before reaching the “biological limit”. It is known that a woman’s 
fecundity starts to decline from their mid 30s (McFalls 1990). If the current delay of childbearing 
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comes mainly from the postponement, not from permanent childlessness, the delay will slow down 
before arriving the biological limit. 
Will the negative tempo effects in South Korea disappear eventually? It is hard to estimate 
accurately how much women could delay childbearing while approaching the biological limit. 
Japan has been experiencing fertility decline for more than 40 years with delayed childbearing, but 
its TFR is still in decline. So, even though the current size of the negative tempo effect in South 
Korea may not be sustained in a long term, it is not easy to predict when it will start to decrease in a 
short term. 
There is at least one factor which could slow down the negative tempo effect. This is the 
change of educational attainment. If mothers who have higher degrees have babies at later ages, the 
increase in the proportion of mothers with higher educational attainment may generate tempo 
effects and depress TFR even without an actual delay of childbearing. That is, a mean age at 
childbearing could be delayed by two forces. One is late childbearing within each educational group. 
The other is the increase of the relative size of college educated mothers who have children later 
than mothers who have a high school degree or less. 
 
Table 3.1. at here. 
 
Recently a mother’s educational attainment in South Korea has increased remarkably (See 
Table 3.1). In 1993, almost two thirds of mothers were high school graduates when they have their 
first baby. However, the majority has become college graduates in the 2000s. In 2005, 61 percent of 
mothers had college degrees or higher and high school graduates comprised only 37 percent. At the 
second birth, the proportion of mothers with at least a college degree was 53 percent. This number 
is 8 percent smaller compared to the first birth, but the overall trend is similar to the first birth. The 
proportion of mothers who had a middle school education or less was around 10 percent in 1993, 
whereas it was less than 3 percent in 2005.  
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Figure 3.2 shows the average mother’s age at the first birth and the second birth separately. 
At the first birth, mothers with a college degree or more have children at age 28.9, whereas mothers 
with a high school diploma do so at age 28.1 in 2005. The difference is .8 years and in 1993 it was 
1.5 years. Mothers with high school diplomas have postponed their childbearing much more than 
college graduates so high school graduates would have bigger tempo effects. 
 
Figure 3.10 here. 
 
Figure 3.10 suggests another interesting hypothesis. The slopes in the graph were changed 
at 1999 especially among college graduate mothers at the first birth. The aftermath of the economic 
crisis in 1997 may have made college graduates take more time establishing their careers, causing 
them to postpone having a baby. High school graduates have been adjusting their norms and values 
of childbearing similar to college graduates.  
As the educational attainment is determined in earlier years than those of childbearing, the 
tempo effects driven by compositional change of a mother’s educational attainment is predictable in 
a degree. Table 3.2 shows how many graduates entered a higher academic institution. Practically all 
the elementary and middle school graduates entered a higher school in circa 2000. College 
education is getting much more popular nowadays. Less than one fourth of high school graduates 
went on to college in 1980, whereas more than 80 percent of high school graduates did in 2005. The 
changes are more rapid in recent years. For 10 years from 1985 to 1995, 15.7 percent points 
increased, whereas 30 percent points increased between 1995 and 2005. 
 
Table 3.2 here. 
 
The increase in the proportion of college educated women is about to stabilize in a few 
years. From 1990, the proportion of college graduates has increased by 3 percent on average per 
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year. If the past speed of increasing college education is constant, all high school graduates will 
enter college 6 years from now and the increase will stop. Recently the speed is slowing down. The 
difference between 2004 and 2005 is only 1.1 percent.  
 It is doubtful that universal college education is sustainable. If the percent of college 
educated women starts to reduce, more women could get jobs at earlier ages, married earlier, and 
eventually have children earlier than the older generation does. As most women enter college in 
their late teens, the tempo effects by a compositional change could last for a while. But it suggests 
that the current tempo effects could decrease gradually in a few years. All other things constant; the 
decreasing tempo effects will boost fertility. 
 
Discussion 
Has the tempo effect accounted for the recent fertility decline in South Korea? The 
findings in this paper suggest the positive answer. The fertility decline from 1995 is due to the 
negative tempo effects. More specifically it could be divided into two periods; the tempo-driven era 
(1995-2000) and the quantum and tempo mixed era (2000-2005). 
The restart of the fertility decline during the former period is fully explained by the tempo 
effects. The TFR has declined from 1.71 in 1995 to 1.47 in 2000. The tempo effect has grown 
from .25 births in 1995 to .53 births in 2000 as much as the conventional period TFR dropped. 
Unlike the decline of the conventional period TFR, these adj-TFRs do not indicate the declines till 
2000. It suggests that the decline is not a quantum-driven but a tempo-driven phenomenon. 
The decline during the latter period is different in two ways. First, the speed of the decline 
is sharper and its fertility enters into the lowest-low level. Secondly, it is accompanied by the mix of 
quantum and tempo effects. The recent drop to lowest-low fertility was initiated in 2000 along with 
the sizable tempo effects. The TFR has declined from 1.47 in 2000 to 1.08 in 2005. After 2000, the 
size of the tempo effects is shrinking, though still sizable. Adj-TFRs with variance effect show that 
the tempo effect is somewhat exaggerated during the latter period.  
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Considering taking the several months to a conception plus the 9 months of gestation 
period, 2000 is when women began to adopt a new lifestyle originating from the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. Social and economic changes after the crisis make women not only postpone 
childbearing but also have less number of children. 
The scenario in Figure 3.3.b is unlikely to be realized. Recent extremely low fertility does 
not result solely from tempo effects which could vanish and cause a rebound in the future. Not to 
mention that some delay of childbearing could result in permanent childlessness or fewer children 
than women expected, current fertility declines are related with significant quantum declines as 
well. 
Stressing the significance of tempo effect is relevant to finding a policy to boost fertility 
recovery (Lutz, O'Neill, and Scherbov 2003; Lutz and Skirbekk 2005; Yi. 2007). If the childbearing 
delay slow down or stop, it could be helpful boosting fertility. More positively, if women’s 
childbearing age is advanced, it could generate the positive tempo effect and work for the rise of the 
period TFR. Compared to quantum policy, tempo policy is more acceptable. It is a merit of tempo 
policy. Not because it aims at changing the number of births but because it tries to shift the 
childbearing ages ahead, tempo changes are more acceptable to mothers and fathers.    
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Figure3.1. Trends of Total Fertility Rates, 1980-2006, South Korea. 
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Figure3.2. Age-specific Fertility Rates, 1985, 1995, 2005, South Korea 
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Figure 3.3. Lexus Diagram of Age-specific Fertility Rates, Period TFR and Cohort TFR. 
a. 
Age t-30 t-25 t-20 t-15 t-10 t-5 t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
20-24 0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00  
25-29 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 
30-34 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 
35-39 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 
40-44         0.00 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 
Period TFR 2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.00 2.0 2.0  2.0 2.0 
Cohort TFR       2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0 2.0 
b.  
Age 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
20-24 0.17 0.15  0.13 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02 0.02 
25-29 0.25  0.16 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.08  0.08  0.08 0.08 
30-34 0.12  0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10  0.12  0.12 0.12 
35-39 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.06  0.06 0.06 
40-44   0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.02  0.03 0.04 
Period TFR 2.89  1.69 1.58 1.71 1.48 1.08 1.20  1.50  1.55 1.60 
Cohort TFR       2.36 1.89 1.93 1.92  1.75  1.62 1.60 
 
At a, cohort TFR is obtained by summing up the grey cells 
At b, black is from the real dataset – South Korea, 1975-2005, while red is from a fictitious dataset. 
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Figure3.4. Mean Age at Childbearing by Birth Orders, 1985-2006, South Korea 
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Figure 3.5. r of Bongaarts-Feeney Method, 1985- 2005, South Korea 
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Figure 3.6. Adjusted Total Fertility Rates, 1985- 2005, South Korea 
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Figure 3.7. Birth-Free Survival Curves, 2000-2003, South Korea 
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Figure 3.8. r of Bongaarts-Feeney Method vs. Gamma of Kholer-Philipov Method, 1986-2005, 
South Korea 
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Figure 3.9. Adjusted Total Fertility Rates with Variance Effect, 1986-2005, South Korea 
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Table 3.1. Ratio of Mother’s Education, First Births and Second Births, 1993-2005, South Korea 
    1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Mother's Education at the First Birth        
 College Graduates or More 25.9 28.5 32.6 39.3 46.5  54.8  61.1 
 High School Graduates 64.2 64.7 62.2 57.0 50.7  43.0  36.7 
 Middle School Graduates or Less 9.9 6.8 5.2 3.7 2.9  2.3  2.3 
         
Mother's Education at the Second Birth        
 College Graduates or More 21.9 24.4 27.7 32.0 38.1  45.8  53.3 
 High School Graduates 63.8 66.0 65.7 63.5 58.8  52.0  44.9 
 Middle School Graduates or Less 14.3 9.6 6.6 4.5 2.6  2.2  1.8 
         
Proportion of the First Births 52.1 48.4 48.4 50.1 47.7  49.6  51.8 
Proportion of the Second Births 39.9 42.9 41.7 40.1 42.3  41.0  38.6 
Proportion of the third or Later Births 8.1 8.7 9.9 9.8 10.1  9.5  9.6 
Source: Birth Register of South Korea, estimated by the author 
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Figure 3.10. Average Mother’s Age at the First Birth and the Second Birth by Educational 
Attainment, 1993-2005, South Korea 
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Table 3.2. Ratio of Students who go on to a Higher Stage of Education, 1980-2005, South Korea1 
  From Elementary School  to Middle School 
From Middle School 
to High School 
From High School 
to College2 
  All Female All Female All Female 
1980 95.8 94.1 84.5 80.8 23.7 22.5 
1985 99.2 99.1 90.7 88.2 36.4 34.1 
1990 99.8 99.8 95.7 95.0 33.2 32.4 
1995 99.9 99.9 98.5 98.4 51.4 49.8 
2000 99.9 99.9 99.6 99.6 68.0 65.4 
2004 99.9 99.9 99.7 99.7 81.3 79.7 
2005 99.9 99.9 99.7 99.8 82.1 80.8 
1 Ratio = Number of students who go on to a higher stage of education / Number of graduates * 100 
2 College includes 2-year Colleges, and educational Colleges.  
SOURCE: http://nsportal.stat.go.kr/static/teen/teen03/1172953_1498.jsp  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Coefficients from Discrete Hazard Model of First Birth on Hourly Wage at 40 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Wage at 40 -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.018**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
(Age-21) 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.129*** 0.146*** 0.146***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
(Age-21)2 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.226** -0.222** -0.172* -0.235** -0.239**
(0.070) (0.075) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076) 
Hispanic 0.062 0.057 0.04 0.045 0.045 
(0.076) (0.084) (0.077) (0.085) (0.085) 
White (Reference Category) - - - 
Number of Expected Birth 0.060** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Attitdue on Traditional Family 0.063 0.064 0.027 0.022 
(0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.063) 
Expectation at 35 0.133 0.126 0.103 0.105 
(0.076) (0.069) (0.076) (0.077) 
Expected Ability at 35 -0.085* -0.099** -0.098* -0.100* 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) 
Less than High School 0.013 0.1 -0.112 
(0.134) (0.145) (0.244) 
High School (Reference Category) - - 
Some College Experience -0.191** -0.212** -0.248 
(0.069) (0.076) (0.153) 
College Degree or Higher -0.390*** -0.289*** -0.540***
(0.070) (0.081) (0.156) 
Wage * Less than High School 0.017 
(0.017) 
Wage * High School (Reference Category) 
Wage * Some College Experience 0.003 
(0.008) 
Wage * College Degree or Higher 0.013 
(0.007) 
Constant -2.359*** -2.513*** -2.578*** -2.358*** -2.234***
(0.088) (0.185) (0.160) (0.189) (0.205) 
N 20701 18014 21335 18014 18014 
LL -4986 -4320 -5223 -4312 -4310 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001
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Coefficients from Discrete Hazard Model of First Birth on Lagged Hourly Wage  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Hourly Wage, 2 Year Lagged 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.018*** -0.012 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
(Age-21) 0.099*** 0.106*** 0.129*** 0.108*** 0.111***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
(Age-21)2 - - - - -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black -0.12 -0.106 -0.172* -0.134 -0.159* 
(0.065) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
Hispanic 0.1 0.082 0.04 0.043 0.052 
(0.069) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
White (Reference Category) - - - 
Number of Expected Birth 0.061* 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.077***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Attitdue on Traditional Family 0.150* 0.064 0.089 0.069 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Expectation at 35 0.161* 0.126 0.121 0.132 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Expected Ability at 35 -0.062 -0.099** -0.090* -0.096**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Less than High School 0.013 0.062 0.048 
(0.134) (0.135) (0.257) 
High School (Reference Category) - - 
Some College Experience -0.191** -0.210** -0.402**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.141) 
College Degree or Higher - - -
(0.070) (0.071) (0.132) 
Wage * Less than High School -0.009 
(0.027) 
Wage * High School (Reference Category) 
Wage * Some College Experience 0.019 
(0.010) 
Wage * College Degree or Higher 0.049***
(0.009) 
Constant - - - - -
(0.072) (0.155) (0.160) (0.163) (0.183) 
N 24597 21335 21335 21335 21335 
LL         -6048 -5232 -5223 -5210 -5188 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001
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